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Abstract: Our healthcare system is broken. Despite spending far more on 
healthcare per capita than any other country, health outcomes in the United States 
are relatively poor. There is a pervasive disconnect within the healthcare system be-
tween private incentives to develop and provide healthcare products and services 
and public health needs. Mainstream proposals for how to fix the system have fo-
cused on changes in regulation, incentive schemes, consumer behavior, and compe-
tition in healthcare markets. All of these proposals share the assumption that the 
development and provision of healthcare products and services will remain pri-
marily in the hands of traditional corporations and, to a lesser extent, non-profit or-
ganizations operating within a market-based healthcare system. Yet, as this Article 
demonstrates, there is an inherent problem with relying on profit-focused corpora-
tions to drive healthcare innovation and provide healthcare products and services. 
Traditional corporations are structured to focus on profits rather than to tend to the 
public need, a focus that is reinforced by the legal framework that governs them. 
Even though this profit focus is not unusual nor considered undesirable in most 
markets, healthcare markets are different in ways that create a divergence between 
the private incentives to which corporations respond and public health needs. In 
this Article, we suggest that a change in corporate form can be used to more closely 
align private incentives with public need by changing corporate incentives from the 
inside. We propose that companies involved in the provision of healthcare products 
and services should be encouraged or even required to assume alternative business 
forms that would both enable and require them to consider the needs of a broader 
range of stakeholders and the public interest in addition to shareholder value. We 
identify benefit corporations, broadly defined, as one preferred mechanism for 
achieving this. We conclude that this approach could help to change corporate be-
havior in ways that improve healthcare outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. healthcare system is failing us in many ways.1 We spend more 
on healthcare both in terms of percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and per capita than any other industrialized nation.2 We consume more 
healthcare technology than any of these nations.3 Yet, our healthcare outcomes 
are almost uniformly among the worst of all Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) countries.4 Healthcare products and services 
are excessively priced,5 leaving many healthcare consumers with limited or no 
                                                                                                                           
 * The authors would like to thank Joel Bakan, Michael Carrier, Jorge Contreras, Erin Fuse 
Brown, Marc-Andre Gagnon, Sam Halabi, Cynthia Ho, Dmitry Karshtedt, Daryl Lim, Timothy Lyt-
ton, Mark Rothstein, Ana Rutschman, Jacob Sherkow, the participants in the 2017 Emory Faculty 
Colloquium, and the participants in the 2018 Georgia State University College of Law Faculty Work-
shop for their valuable comments. While this Article has been enriched by their comments and ideas, 
all mistakes and shortcomings remain our own. We regard this Article as the start of a critical conver-
sation about corporate form in healthcare markets rather than as a road map or a conclusion. Finally, 
we are grateful to Brandon Reed for superb research assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG 
BUSINESS AND HOW YOU CAN TAKE IT BACK (2017) (analyzing the destructive outcomes for patients 
in a profit focused healthcare industry); Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, 
TIME (Mar. 4, 2013), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/printout/0,8816,2136864,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/ED8Q-Y5CU] (reporting on the myriad problems that are leading to high costs and 
poor outcomes in the U.S. healthcare system). 
 2 See National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet 2015, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 
(last updated Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html [https://perma.cc/DFC8-C9EF] 
[hereinafter National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet 2015] (providing an overview of national health 
spending); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COUNTRY NOTE: HOW DOES HEALTH 
SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES COMPARE? 1 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Country-
Note-UNITED STATES-OECD-Health-Statistics-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5PW-9CXF] [hereinaf-
ter OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2015] (showing that the United States is spending more than any other 
nation on healthcare in terms of GDP); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A 
GLANCE 2015: OECD INDICATORS 164 (2015) [hereinafter HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2015] (providing a 
statistical analysis of healthcare systems performance in OECD countries). 
 3 See, e.g., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2015, supra note 2, at 30 (finding that in 2013 the United 
States spent twice as much on pharmaceuticals than the “OECD average, and more than 35% higher 
than . . . Japan, the next highest spender”); see also id. at 102 (finding “[t]he number of CT exams per 
capita is highest in the U.S.” and the “number of MRI exams more than doubled between 2000 and 
2013”); National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet 2015, supra note 2 (finding the national health ex-
penditure reached $3.0 trillion). 
 4 See, e.g., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2015, supra note 2, at 26 (reporting the United States has a 
relatively low life expectancy when compared to its high spending on healthcare, and that the United 
States is a “bottom third performer” for quality of care as measured by hospital admissions associated 
with asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and diabetes); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2017: HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES COMPARE? (2017), 
https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Health-at-a-Glance-2017-Key-Findings-UNITED-STATES.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7VQ6-UX5X] (finding that life expectancy in 2015 in the United States was 78.8 
years, 2 years less than the OECD average). 
 5 By “excessively” we mean two things: (a) significantly—i.e., by orders of magnitude—more 
expensive than the marginal or even the average cost of making the product or rendering the service; 
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access to the products and services that they need.6 For those who can pay for 
healthcare, either directly or through healthcare insurance, prices often bear 
little relationship to health need or benefit, leading to ineffective and unsus-
tainable healthcare spending.7 In stark contrast to the poor health outcomes for 
patient-consumers, financial outcomes for many of the healthcare companies 
in U.S. markets are extremely good.8 Many sectors of the healthcare industry 
                                                                                                                           
and (b) significantly more than what is being paid for the same products and services in other coun-
tries. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2012: U.S. HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 6, 7–14 (2012) (comparing the United States’ hefty 
spending on healthcare to other countries throughout the world); INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS, 
2011 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL FEES BY COUNTRY 7–8, 24–25 (2011) 
(reporting significant discrepancies in the average cost of a variety of medical products between the 
United States and other countries); Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 
67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 92–103 (2015) (discussing the reasons and causes for the “excessive and inex-
plicable” prices of healthcare in the United States in general and in the hospital industry in particular); 
Daniel A. Goldstein et al., Global Differences in Cancer Drug Prices: A Comparative Analysis, 34 J. 
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY (Suppl. Abstr. LBA6500) (2016), http://ascopubs.org/doi/abs/10.1200/JCO.
2016.34.18_suppl.LBA6500 (documenting high drug prices in the United States compared to other 
countries); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the U.S.: Origins and 
Prospects of Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016), https://phhp-bahealthscience-new.sites.medinfo.ufl.
edu/files/2016/09/jsc1600151.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9A5-RFF6] (finding that per capita prescription 
drug spending in the United States exceeds all other countries and that this increased expenditure is 
driven mostly by high brand-name drug prices); Miriam J. Laugesen & Sherry A. Glied, Higher Fees 
Paid to U.S. Physicians Drive Higher Spending for Physician Services Compared to Other Countries, 
30 HEALTH AFF. 1647, 1654 (2011) (finding higher fees for primary care and orthopedic physicians 
responsible for higher spending on physician services). 
 6 See, e.g., MURRAY AITKEN & SILVIA VALKOVA, IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, 
AVOIDABLE COSTS IN U.S. HEALTHCARE 7–8 (2013), http://offers.premierinc.com/rs/381-NBB-
525/images/Avoidable_Costs_in%20_US_Healthcare-IHII_AvoidableCosts_2013%5B1%5D.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6CDF-UTZ9] (estimating that the cost of medical non-adherence—namely, when 
patients do not take their medicines appropriately or at all, including due to cost—in 2013 in the Unit-
ed States reached $105 billion); Emily R. Cox et al., Medicare Beneficiaries’ Management of Capped 
Prescription Benefits, 39 MED. CARE 296, 296 (2001) (finding Medicare beneficiaries exposed to 
health risks due to efforts aimed at minimizing out-of-pocket drug costs); Kathryn E. Weaver et al., 
Forgoing Medical Care Because of Cost, 116 CANCER 3493, 3495 (2010) (reporting on cancer survi-
vors forfeiting medical services because of cost). 
 7 See M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 391–92 
(2009) (describing the unsustainable increase in medical spending, particularly for treatments with 
“unproven value,” and estimating that medical spending will increase to 30% of GDP in the next quar-
ter century); Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Gatekeepers, 47 IND. L. REV. 363, 364 (2014) (de-
scribing “the lawful sale of medicines that have little or no therapeutic effect” and referring to “the 
surprising absence of substantial efficacy or advantage exhibited by many of today’s most celebrated 
pharmaceuticals”). 
 8 For purposes of this Article, we define “healthcare companies” as for-profit business entities 
involved in the commercial development, manufacture, or distribution of healthcare products and 
services. Healthcare companies may include pharmaceutical companies and other developers of bio-
medical technology, distributors and retailers of medical supplies (including retail pharmacies), medi-
cal insurance companies, pharmacy benefit management companies, laboratories, and so forth. We 
acknowledge that healthcare markets are complex and operate in different ways, subject to different 
constraints, and that these markets are constantly changing, but we argue that private profit incentives 
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rank among the most profitable sectors in the U.S. economy, some even on par 
with the banking sector.9 The pharmaceutical industry in particular has enjoyed 
a median return on assets that exceeds the median return for all Fortune 500 
companies by two or three times.10 More recently, health insurance companies 
have been outperforming the market, with the growth of the six largest health 
insurance companies far exceeding the growth of the overall S&P 500 
healthcare sector and with record profits expected to continue.11 
There are many factors that contribute to the broken state of the 
healthcare system. Current proposals for how to fix our healthcare system have 
focused primarily on changes to healthcare regulation,12 alternative incentive 
                                                                                                                           
largely explain choices made by healthcare companies and that a divergence of private and public 
interests persists across different parts of the market. Even though we largely focus on for-profit or-
ganizations, in Part III we suggest why in many cases benefit corporations may also be preferable to 
non-profit organizations, although we leave a more detailed comparison and analysis for a separate 
article. 
 9 According to Forbes, the average net profit margin of the top ten drug companies in 2014 was 
19%, which was the highest of all five industries surveyed and the same as the average profit margin 
of the ten biggest banks surveyed. Liyan Chen, Best of The Biggest: How Profitable Are the World’s 
Largest Companies?, FORBES (May 13, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2014/05/13/
best-of-the-biggest-how-profitable-are-the-worlds-largest-companies/#505104be4c33 [https://perma.
cc/M4MT-E83Q]; see Marc-André Gagnon, Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets: Addressing the 
Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 571, 577 fig.1 
(2013) (comparing the net return on revenues of average U.S. major pharmaceutical companies with 
that of an average Fortune 500 company); see also, e.g., Phillip Mattera, Taking the Profit Out of 
Health Insurance: A Response to Jacob Hacker and Andrew Stern, 16 NEW LAB. F. 47, 50–51 (2007) 
(highlighting increasing profits for healthcare companies); Press Release, Hospital Corporation of 
America, HCA Reports Second Quarter 2015 Results 1 (Aug. 5, 2015), http://investor.hcahealthcare.
com/press-release/hca-reports-second-quarter-2015-results [https://perma.cc/EU33-9YLD] (reporting 
second quarter financial and operating data for Hospital Corporation of America). 
 10 See, e.g., Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223 [https://perma.cc/9GJY-XNCU] (re-
porting on revenue outcomes for the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies); Alfred B. Engelberg, 
How Government Policy Promotes High Drug Prices, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://health
affairs.org/blog/2015/10/29/how-government-policy-promotes-high-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/
MCR3-8TS7] (analyzing the outcomes of U.S. laws which curb innovation and competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry). 
 11 See Bertha Coombs, As Obamacare Twists in Political Winds, Top Insurers Made $6 Billion 
(Not That There Is Anything Wrong with That), CNBC HEALTH & SCI. (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.
cnbc.com/2017/08/05/top-health-insurers-profit-surge-29-percent-to-6-billion-dollars.html [https://
perma.cc/CP9M-Q834] (highlighting increasing revenues for the nation’s top health insurers). 
 12 See, e.g., THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 15 (Einer R. 
Elhauge ed., 2010) (exploring regulatory responses to problem of fragmentation); Fuse Brown, supra 
note 5, at 128–37 (calling for the imposition of government controls on prices for healthcare products 
and services); Bruce C. Vladeck & Thomas Rice, Market Failure and the Failure of Discourse: Fac-
ing up to the Power of Sellers, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1312–13 (2009) (suggesting an “all-payer sys-
tem” where every player’s behavior is highly regulated and “payments are uniform across insurers”). 
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schemes for healthcare companies,13 changes in healthcare purchaser and con-
sumer behavior,14 and efforts to increase competition in healthcare markets.15 
Almost all of these proposals, including those currently being debated at the 
federal and the state level, share the assumption that the provision of 
healthcare products and services will remain largely in the hands of traditional 
corporations and, to a lesser extent, non-profit organizations, operating within 
a market-based healthcare system. The proposed interventions are targeted at 
changing the market environment in which these entities operate rather than 
replacing the market altogether or changing the entities themselves. By failing 
to directly target the limitations of the corporate form as a mechanism for 
healthcare provision, however, these approaches neglect another important and 
largely underexplored avenue for market-driven change. This mechanism is 
particularly important in a political environment where alternative regulatory 
or public-provision solutions remain unlikely and conversions of non-profit to 
for-profit entities are increasing. We suggest that it is time to include the cor-
porate form itself in discussions about healthcare reform. 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarnoe, Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partner-
ships: Moving from the Bench to the Bedside, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 373, 373 (2014) (proposing to 
“enhance the likelihood of successful commercialization of pharmacological discoveries” changing 
the incentive schemes of parties involved in for-profit pharmaceutical public-private partnerships). See 
generally Segundo Mariz et al., Worldwide Collaboration for Orphan Drug Designation, 15 NATURE 
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 440, 440–41 (2016) (providing a comparison across countries of alternative 
mechanisms, including tax breaks and regulatory exclusivities, to incentivize production of orphan 
drugs). 
 14 See Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal Approach to 
Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 792–96 (2016) (advocating for the use of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498 by the government in order to lower the cost of expensive prescription medicines); Kesselheim 
et al., supra note 5, at 866 (proposing “Physician-  and Patient-Level Solutions” to the problem of 
high drug prices); Paul J. Zwier, High Prices in the U.S. for Life-Saving Drugs: Collective Bargaining 
Through Tort Law?, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 203, 209–14 (2016) (proposing to 
use the tort causes of action of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress to curb exorbitant pricing of lifesaving drugs). 
 15 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Alpern et al., High-Cost Generic Drugs—Implications for Patients and 
Policymakers, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1859, 1861 (2014) (advocating for the creation of a special 
pathway for approval of off-patent, already-approved medicines so as “to promote competition and 
permit the private market to function more efficiently”); Rena M. Conti & Meredith B. Rosenthal, 
Pharmaceutical Policy Reform—Balancing Affordability with Incentives for Innovation, 374 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 703, 704 (2016) (analyzing reforms that could catalyze to competition in the healthcare 
market); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health Care, 
89 OR. L. REV. 847, 876 (2011) (“As a strategy to restore competition in health care markets, antitrust 
enforcers might focus their efforts on requiring hospitals and other provider entities to unbundle, at a 
purchaser’s request, their competitive and monopolized services for purposes of negotiating prices.”); 
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Lawmakers Look for Ways to Provide Relief for High Cost of Drugs., N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, at A17 (describing legislative initiatives meant to increase competition in 
pharmaceutical markets by allowing parallel imports of drugs). 
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In this Article, we argue that many of the problems besetting the healthcare 
system have a common foundation in the pervasive disconnect between the 
private incentives of the companies that develop and provide healthcare prod-
ucts and services and public health needs.16 We suggest that, for so long as we 
continue to rely on a market-based system of healthcare, changing the internal 
incentives of the companies themselves can be an effective way of reducing 
this disconnect. This approach is advocated not as a substitute for but as a 
complement to public-interest centered regulation, seeking to alter the deci-
sion-making of private actors from the inside in ways that can be reinforced by 
regulation to further public health objectives.17 
Currently, the development and provision of many healthcare products 
and services to meet public health needs remains, with the exception of hospi-
tal services, largely in the hands of traditional corporations.18 Traditional cor-
porations are primarily incentivized to pursue the maximization of value for 
their shareholders,19 making stock value and profits from the sale of products 
and services the primary focus of corporate decisions.20 This profit-driven ap-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Gagnon, supra note 9, at 571–80 (documenting negative healthcare outcomes as a result of 
profit-focused healthcare corporations). 
 17 We are not arguing that a change in corporate structure can, by itself, solve the myriad of prob-
lems with the healthcare system, but rather that changes in corporate form can and should be an im-
portant part of broader government-driven reforms to the system. See generally Joel Bakan, The Invis-
ible Hand of Law: Private Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279 (2015) (warn-
ing of reliance on private regulation norms as replacements for state action and responsibility). 
 18 Moreover, even though many hospitals are non-profit organizations, this does not guarantee a 
focus on the public need. See Rick Cohen, Nonprofit Hospitals No Better Than For-Profits on Charity 
Care, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/08/07/nonprofit-hospitals-
no-better-than-for-profits-on-charity-care/ [https://perma.cc/2F97-6XG7] (“The real question is just 
how ‘nonprofit’ nonprofit hospitals actually are. . . . The nonprofit sector has to live up to a legitimate 
debate about whether some—or many—nonprofit hospitals are not living up to mandates of service to 
people in need.”); see also infra notes 150, and 203–266. 
 19 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to 
be employed for that end.”); JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF 
PROFIT AND POWER 36 (2004) (“Dodge v. Ford still stands for the legal principle that managers and 
directors have a legal duty to put shareholders’ interests above all others and no legal authority to 
serve any other interests.”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corpo-
rate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). 
 20 See BAKAN, supra note 19, at 37 (“The law forbids any other motivation for [corporate] action, 
whether to assist workers, improve the environment, or help consumers save money. [Corporate man-
agers] can do these things with their own money, as private citizens. As corporate officials, however, 
stewards of other people’s money, they have no legal authority to pursue such goals as ends in them-
selves—only as means to serve the corporation’s own interests, which generally means to maximize 
the wealth of its shareholders.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets 
of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 (1982) (“[A] corporation is no more than a convenient 
name for a nexus of contractual relationships among people. Only people have moral obligations; 
corporations can no more be said to have moral obligations than does a building, an organization 
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proach is not unusual, nor is it considered undesirable or unwarranted in many 
markets.21 But, notwithstanding their variety and complexity, the markets in 
many, if not most, sectors of the healthcare industry share three distinctive 
characteristics, the combination of which leads to the failure of the traditional 
corporate model to effectively meet public needs.22 These three characteristics 
are: (1) the failure of price to serve as a good indicator of public health value; 
(2) the public sharing of costs but not benefits; and (3) regulation and market 
structure that limit competition. When traditional corporations are left to make 
their own decisions about the provision of healthcare products and services in 
these types of markets, their actions are often socially sub-optimal and some-
times in direct conflict with public health needs, resulting in high social costs 
and poor public health outcomes. 
We address the disconnect between private incentives and public needs 
head on, proposing an approach to healthcare reform that seeks to more closely 
align private incentives with public need by changing the business form of 
companies selling healthcare products and services in these types of markets 
(referred to herein as healthcare companies and healthcare markets).23 We ar-
gue that healthcare companies should be strongly incentivized or even required 
to assume alternative business forms that both enable and oblige them to take 
broader stakeholder and public interests into account in corporate decision-
                                                                                                                           
chart, or a contract.”); Robert C. Hinkley, How Corporate Law Inhibits Social Responsibility, HU-
MANIST, Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 27 (arguing that corporations are structured by law to pursue only the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders and give such interests precedence over the public 
interest). For a more detailed discussion of the degree to which corporations focus on shareholder 
value, see infra notes 203–266. 
 21 See BAKAN, supra note 19, at 34–35 (citing agreement among thought leaders from different 
ends of the political and ideological spectrum that, ultimately, “corporations must be concerned only 
for their stockholders and . . . not the community or the workforce or whatever”); see also PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 1994) 
(“[A] corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhanc-
ing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”). 
 22 Although we rely for our examples primarily on pharmaceutical markets where the problems 
with relying on the market to serve public health needs are at their most severe, the arguments that we 
make about the disconnect between public health and private corporate incentives apply to other 
healthcare markets that share the three characteristics described in this Part. Where price does not 
reflect value, costs are socialized but benefits are not, and competition is limited, companies are free 
to set prices and make other product decisions without the constraint of pursuing public health value. 
 23 This idea of using alternative company structures, while not new in other contexts, is starting to 
gather steam in the healthcare context. The precise reasons for doing so have not been sufficiently 
fleshed out. See generally Arnold Eiser & Robert Field, Can Benefit Corporations Redeem the Phar-
maceutical Industry, 129 AM. J. MED. 651 (2016) (suggesting benefit corporations could heal numer-
ous issues plaguing the healthcare industry); Katherine R. Lofft et al., Is a Hybrid Just What the Doc-
tor Ordered? Evaluating the Potential Use of Alternative Company Structures by Healthcare Enter-
prises, THE HEALTH LAW., Apr. 2013, at 9–16 (analyzing the numerous factors facilitating change to 
corporate models in the healthcare industry). 
2019] Why Healthcare Companies Should Be(come) Benefit Corporations 81 
making. We propose the collection of business forms generally referred to as 
“benefit corporations” as desirable business forms for these healthcare compa-
nies.24 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the nature and scope 
of the disconnect between current private market incentives and public need in 
healthcare markets, using the pharmaceutical industry as the most salient ex-
ample of the disconnect. It provides representative examples from across the 
product lifecycle to illustrate how pharmaceutical companies, simply by oper-
ating in accordance with their mandate to pursue shareholder value, make de-
cisions at every stage of the product and service lifecycle that fail to align with 
public health needs. Part II analyzes the source of this disconnect, showing 
why it is that traditional corporations are ill-suited to healthcare markets from 
a public health perspective. Although the argument is anchored in examples 
drawn from pharmaceutical markets, where the source of the disconnect is 
easy to identify, it extends to other markets in the healthcare industry that share 
the same characteristics, and it is these markets on which we base our analysis. 
Part III proposes the use of alternative business forms in healthcare markets as 
a way of reducing the disconnect between private incentives and public health 
needs both by altering incentives from the inside and improving the ability to 
regulate from the outside. We conclude that healthcare outcomes could be im-
proved by requiring, or at least strongly incentivizing, healthcare companies to 
incorporate or re-incorporate as one of these alternative forms, proposing bene-
fit corporations as one such choice. 
I. ILLUSTRATING THE MARKET/PUBLIC-HEALTH  
DISCONNECT IN PHARMACEUTICALS 
Although there are a variety of ways in which the public interest in health 
can be defined, few would dispute that the public has a shared interest in re-
ducing their general morbidity and mortality.25 The goals of reducing morbidi-
ty and mortality underlie virtually every public health policy and inform gen-
                                                                                                                           
 24 We recognize that this approach is not sufficient, on its own, to address the myriad of problems 
with the healthcare system, but we argue that for so long as the United States continues to rely on a 
market-based approach to healthcare, changing the internal incentives of the market actors is a critical 
part of efforts to improve public health outcomes. 
 25 See Christian Munthe, The Goals of Public Health: An Integrated, Multidimensional Model, 1 
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 39, 39–41 (2008) (exploring goals driving public health policies and the ten-
sions between individual and population-based health); Gabriel N. Stover & Mary T. Bassett, Editori-
al, Practice Is the Purpose of Public Health, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1799, 1799 (2003) (“All who 
work in public health share this common goal: to prevent disease and promote health.”). 
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erally accepted measures of public health benefits.26 The U.S. healthcare sys-
tem relies largely on a market-based system to produce the goods and services 
needed to meet these public health objectives and on a fragmented mix of pub-
lic and private entities and end users to pay for them. Yet when traditional cor-
porations are left to make their own decisions about matters that involve hu-
man health—for example, what products and services to produce and at what 
prices—their decisions are based on financial goals. Thus, where the financial 
incentives facing healthcare companies, as well as the top-level corporate ex-
ecutives that run them, do not adequately reflect public health needs, it should 
be no surprise that this system fails to produce good public health outcomes. 
The disconnect between private incentives and public health needs in 
healthcare markets is perhaps most stark in the pharmaceutical industry, and in 
this Part, we use examples drawn from that industry to illustrate the nature and 
magnitude of the harm that can arise from the market disconnect.27 We draw 
examples from four different decision-making points in the discovery, devel-
opment, and sale of pharmaceutical products to illustrate the pervasive and 
continuous disconnect between private incentives and public health needs at 
every stage of the pharmaceutical product lifecycle. These decision points are 
not unique, and there are many other types of decisions that also impact the 
gap between what the market provides and what the public needs. We exclude 
from our consideration corporate decisions that are considered to be illegal, 
focusing only on decisions made by companies acting (mostly) within the 
boundaries of the law to maximize shareholder value in accordance with cor-
porate law requirements and market expectations.28 The examples illustrate 
how pharmaceutical companies, simply by doing what they are designed to do, 
contribute to the problems besetting the healthcare system.29 We suggest that a 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See, e.g., Stephen B. Thacker et al., Measuring the Public’s Health, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 14, 
15–16 (2006) (discussing the continued focus on measures of morbidity, mortality, and disability as 
measures of public health). 
 27 In the context of this Article, “pharmaceutical industry” and “pharmaceutical companies” are 
defined as companies engaged in the discovery, research and development, and production of pharma-
ceutical products, whereas “pharmaceutical products” and “drugs,” for short, are defined broadly as 
including small-molecule drugs, biologics, vaccines, and any other medicinal compounds made to 
diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent a disease. 
 28 In many cases, the high profits earned—often at the sacrifice of public health benefits—are 
rewarded through high returns and premium payments to top executives. See Matt Krantz, Drug Pric-
es Are High. So Are the CEOs’ Pay, USA TODAY (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/markets/2016/08/26/drug-money-pharma-ceos-paid-71-more/89369152/ [https://perma.cc/
XJ4Y-AG64] (stating that “CEOs of the 14 biotech and pharmaceutical companies in the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 that served all of 2015 pulled down median compensation packages valued at $18.5 mil-
lion in 2015 . . .” which “was 71% greater than the median $10.8 million hauled in by S&P 500 ex-
ecutives in all industries in 2015 . . . .”). 
 29 This argument can be taken even further to suggest that the legal structures that govern phar-
maceutical industry behavior have themselves become subordinated to corporate interests. See Eugene 
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similar approach can be used in other healthcare markets (those sharing the 
same three characteristics identified) for other healthcare products and services 
where similar disconnects between private profit-driven incentives and public 
needs result in high costs and poor health outcomes.30 
A. First Example: Decisions About Which Products to Develop 
Decisions about which disease area(s) to focus on, and within a disease 
area, which potential drugs to investigate and pursue through further invest-
ments in research and development (R&D) are among the most critical deci-
sions that pharmaceutical companies must make. The decisions about which 
disease areas and which projects within these areas to pursue are driven in part 
by scientific opportunity, but even more by considerations of the potential 
profitability and level of risk associated with available drug candidates. Alt-
hough many new ideas are pursued by smaller venture-backed start-up compa-
nies, pharmaceutical companies enter at later stages to select among available 
ideas and identify those they will move into development, and anticipation of 
this exit strategy impacts earlier project and investment choices. Companies 
look for projects that are likely to yield the largest expected net profits at the 
lowest risk, seeking promises of high profits to offset the large costs and uncer-
tainties of drug discovery and development. Federal legislation reinforces this 
profit-focused approach by providing additional financial incentives for devel-
opers of drugs for certain types of patient populations and medical conditions 
in areas where the market returns are perceived as being too small to attract 
desired investment.31 
                                                                                                                           
McCarthy, The Pharma Barons: Corporate Law’s Dangerous New “Race to the Bottom” in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that 
industry players have transformed the legal structure “to allow them to profit with legal impunity at 
the public’s expense”). 
 30 See, e.g., Irene Papanicolas et al, Health Care Spending in the United States and Other High-
Income Countries, 319 JAMA 1024, 1024 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29536101 
[https://perma.cc/HB6U-8X6X] (study showing that the US spent nearly twice as much as ten high 
income countries on medical care while performing less well on outcomes, points to high prices for 
healthcare products and services); Yoni Blumberg, Here’s the Real Reason Health Care Cost Much 
More in the US, CNBC MONEY (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/22/the-real-reason-
medical-care-costs-so-much-more-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/7AQE-LPJA] (pointing to high 
prices of healthcare products and services as contributing to high cost of healthcare and problems with 
access); Jessica Glenza, Sky-High Prices of Everything Make U.S. Healthcare the World’s Most Ex-
pensive, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/13/us-
healthcare-costs-causes-drug-prices-salaries [https://perma.cc/HNX9-TA2L] (noting high spending 
across the board in comparison with other OECD countries, with often worse outcomes and less cov-
erage). 
 31 See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3012–3013, 3038, 130 Stat. 1033, 
1091–93, 1105–11 (2016) (providing additional incentives, including priority review vouchers and 
exclusivity periods, for the development of drugs for rare pediatric conditions and combination prod-
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This mode of decision-making might work well in a world in which pric-
es accurately reflect public health benefits, excess profits are competed away, 
and people can rationally evaluate and afford to pay for the drugs that they 
need. But, for a variety of reasons that are further explored in Part II below, the 
relationship between expected profits and actual (or even expected) public 
health benefits is often weak.32 As a result, even diseases that seriously harm 
large populations may be ignored by the pharmaceutical industry simply be-
cause the areas or the potential drug candidates within those areas are regarded 
as too risky or insufficiently profitable. Instead, an increasing number of 
pharmaceutical companies pursue R&D projects aimed at developing therapies 
for “lucrative” medical conditions, many of which are not considered severe or 
which already have effective therapies available (“me-too drugs”).33 
The disconnect between private incentives and public health need is most 
starkly illustrated by the disproportionate amount of investment in diseases of 
the rich and the neglect of diseases affecting primarily poorer populations—the 
latter commonly referred to as neglected diseases.34 Notable examples of ne-
                                                                                                                           
ucts); Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2053–56 (1983) (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–ee and scattered sections of 25, 35, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)) (providing additional 
tax benefits and exclusivities to developers of drugs designated for rare diseases). 
 32 See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, LIVES ON THE EDGE: TIME TO ALIGN MEDICAL RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT WITH PEOPLE’S HEALTH NEEDS 2 (2016) [hereinafter LIVES ON THE EDGE] 
(“With current incentive mechanisms, the biomedical innovation system concentrates investment on 
products that will sell well, and not necessarily on existing public health priorities.”). 
 33 According to the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment: 
Me-too drugs are introduced after the pioneer and are similar but not identical to pio-
neer compounds in molecular structure and mechanism of action. Many me-too drugs 
are developed through deliberate imitation of the pioneer compound and have a shorter 
and more certain discovery period. 
. . . . 
The pursuit of “me-too” drugs is an attempt by rival firms to shave off part of the mo-
nopoly profits enjoyed by the maker of the pioneer drug in a therapeutic class. The 
higher the initial monopoly profits, the more incentive rivals have to develop a similar 
competing drug. 
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS & RE-
WARDS 7, 45–46 (1993), ota.fas.org/reports/9336.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNG7-33P3]; see also LIVES 
ON THE EDGE, supra note 32, at 11 (“‘[M]e-too’ drugs . . . have only small clinical advantages over 
existing drugs, but . . . can be patented and bring substantial profits.”). 
 34 See LIVES ON THE EDGE, supra note 32, at 45 (defining neglected diseases as “[a] diverse 
group of diseases and conditions affecting more than a billion people worldwide, but few in wealthy 
markets”); see also Margaret Chan, Dir.-Gen. of the World Health Org., Keynote Address to the Re-
gional Committee for the Western Pacific (Oct. 13, 2014), transcript available at http://www.who.
int/dg/speeches/2014/regional-committee-western-pacific/en/ [https://perma.cc/WB3E-QUXQ]) (“A 
profit-driven industry does not invest in products for markets that cannot pay.”). 
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glected diseases include: malaria,35 which kills hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple in developing countries each year; tuberculosis, which was responsible for 
the death of 1.5 million people in 2014 alone;36 Ebola, which during the 2014 
outbreak in West Africa caused the death of 11,310 people;37 and Chagas dis-
ease, a parasitic disease impacting the heart and nervous system that is endem-
ic to South and Central America that causes damage to the heart and central 
nervous system (“CNS”).38 Even though neglected diseases may seem to fall 
outside of the purview of the U.S. healthcare system because the disease bur-
den falls predominately outside of the United States, the potential negative im-
pact of neglected diseases on both the health of the U.S. population and the 
health of the U.S. economy cannot be ignored—as was recently illustrated by 
the Ebola and Zika outbreaks.39 Despite the tremendous financial and public 
health costs of these diseases, however, including potential health and econom-
ic costs within the United States, expected low-market returns deter private 
sector activity.40 As a result, even though tuberculosis and tropical diseases 
accounted for 11.4% of the global disease burden between 1975–1999, only 
1.1% of new chemical entities (“NCEs”) approved during those years were for 
the treatment of such diseases and with limited impact on the disease burden; 
and although 336 NCEs were approved during the years 2000–2011, only four 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Eduardo Porter, Patents’ Rewards Are Also a Barrier, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2016, at B1 
(finding the non-existence of a malaria vaccine tied directly to the inability of the at-risk population’s 
ability to pay for medicine). 
 36 See LIVES ON THE EDGE, supra note 32, at 2 (noting the absence of incentives to develop drugs 
such as tuberculosis). Drug-resistant tuberculosis has also appeared in increasing numbers among 
mostly poor populations in industrialized countries. Id. at 9. 
 37 Id. at 2, 8; see also Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Case Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html [https://
perma.cc/YTL8-8CM9] (reporting on the number of cases and fatalities from Ebola disease during 
2014–2016 in West Africa). 
 38 LIVES ON THE EDGE, supra note 32, at 2, 6. 
 39 See Chris Collins, Global Health is Good Business—Trump Should Get in the Prosperity, THE 
HILL (Jan. 5, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/312923-the-business-case-for-
global-health-in-the-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/397B-7B3G] (noting outbreaks of many 
neglected diseases have no borders and must be considered transnational diseases). 
 40 See LIVES ON THE EDGE, supra note 32, at 2 (“The current biomedical innovation system is 
overwhelmingly driven by financial interests; pharmaceutical companies develop drugs based on the 
likely return that a product will offer through sales. The result is a lack of investment in drugs, diag-
nostics and vaccines to meet the needs of people who can’t afford to pay high prices, or who don’t 
constitute a sizeable or lucrative market.”); Porter, supra note 35 (“Considering the market’s size [for 
malaria treatments], why haven’t pharmaceutical companies rushed to develop a vaccine against the 
deadly parasite that causes it? The answer is easy: There is no money to be made from a vaccine for 
poor children who could not possibly pay for inoculation.”). For a discussion of metrics used to define 
and measure global disease burdens, see generally The Global Burden of Disease Project, IHME, 
http://www.healthdata.org/gbd/ [https://perma.cc/6F5K-MRMM] (describing the data collecting 
methodology for neglected diseases). 
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(1.2%) were for neglected diseases.41 The newest treatment for tuberculosis 
came to the market nearly 50 years ago.42 These problems of private sector 
neglect are further exacerbated in pediatric populations.43 
The disconnect between private incentives and public benefit is not lim-
ited to neglected populations and diseases, however—indeed, far from it. The 
misalignment of project choice and public need is amply demonstrated by the 
simultaneous increase in public health concern over growing antibiotic re-
sistance and the continued exit of pharmaceutical companies from that mar-
ket.44 Despite antibiotics’ immense and ever-growing importance in public 
health, and an already severe and growing public health threat from antibiotic-
resistant bacteria,45 the number of new antibiotic products being developed 
over the past few decades has been decreasing.46 Competition from older anti-
biotic products, the cost and uncertainty of antibiotics R&D, and insufficiency 
of reimbursement incentives lower the financial attractiveness of this market.47 
Hence, the lack of expected profitability has been largely responsible for the 
dearth of antibiotics production by pharmaceutical companies.48 Although a 
                                                                                                                           
 41 LIVES ON THE EDGE, supra note 32, at 5.  
 42 Id. at 9. 
 43 See id. (highlighting the deadly disparity between medicine developed for children and adults). 
 44 See Kevin Outterson et al., Repairing the Broken Market for Antibiotic Innovation, 34 HEALTH 
AFF. 277, 277 (2015) (“Multidrug-resistant bacterial diseases pose serious and growing threats to hu-
man health. . . . But investment is declining in antibiotics . . . .”). Note that the information provided 
herein does not take into account any effects that may have occurred since the passage of the Generat-
ing Antibiotics Incentives Now (“GAIN”) Act in 2012. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and 
Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, §§ 801–806, 126 Stat. 993, 1077–82 (2012) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 355E, 356, 524A) (providing further incentives for the development of antibiotics, includ-
ing an additional period of five years of market exclusivity for products designated for the treatment 
of qualified infectious diseases). 
 45 According to conservative estimates, as of 2013, in the United States, more than two million 
people are sickened every year with antibiotic-resistant infections, with at least 23,000 dying as a 
result of these infections. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RE-
SISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 6 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/
threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4N2-UAZ2] (describing the threat 
of antibiotic resistance in the United States as potentially having “catastrophic consequences”). The 
problem of antibiotic resistance is, of course, not a local issue of the United States. See LIVES ON THE 
EDGE, supra note 32, at 10–11 (addressing the problem of antibiotics-resistance from a global per-
spective). 
 46 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 45, at 44 (showing a clear de-
cline in the number antibacterial New Drug Applications approved between 1980 and 2012); Outter-
son et al., supra note 44, at 277 (noting a decline in antibiotic development in the United States); see 
also Exec. Order No. 13,676, 184 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 18, 2014) (announcing executive measures 
to address the issue of growing antibiotic resistance). 
 47 See Outterson et al., supra note 44, at 278–79 (noting that pharmaceutical companies find that 
“the return on investment is relatively low for antibiotics as a result of low prices, limited market 
uptake, and modest government financial support”). 
 48 See id. at 284 (“The existing price/volume business model for antibiotics is not working and is 
a key barrier to achieving more rapid progress on resistance.”). 
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host of incentive schemes have been proposed to make antibiotics more profit-
able, including price hikes, patent extensions, prizes, and upfront payments, 
trying to replicate the kinds of profits that pharmaceutical companies have 
come to expect through such measures is difficult or even impossible under 
existing innovation schemes.49 
The problems inherent in relying on private project choice to meet public 
health needs are not limited to markets with peculiar features, like those for 
antibiotics or vaccines. Pharmaceutical companies have also been shying away 
from R&D in disease areas where the risks are high, even when the potential 
size of the market is large. Pharmaceutical companies have been reducing their 
efforts to find treatments for health conditions affecting the CNS,50 for exam-
ple, despite the prevalence and enormous societal economic toll of such condi-
tions.51 This is largely because CNS drug research has become comparatively 
more risky and financially less attractive than other disease areas of R&D.52 
Similarly, while Alzheimer’s disease is quickly becoming one of the world’s 
biggest public health problems, many pharmaceutical companies have decided 
not to continue their efforts in this disease area, again, largely because of the 
high costs, risks, and the potential to earn more certain profits in other disease 
areas.53 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See, e.g., Maryn McKenna, We Need Antibiotics. They’re Not Profitable to Make. Who Pays?, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 23, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2015/
05/23/oneill-amr-3/ [https://perma.cc/NZ42-9JU4] (reporting on numerous studies analyzing the eco-
nomic disincentives for creating antibiotics and the health threat it poses). 
 50 Such conditions include mood disorders, psychotic disorders, anxiety disorders, addiction, 
stroke, dementia, and more. See generally Dennis W. Choi et al., Medicines for the Mind: Policy-
Based “Pull” Incentives for Creating Breakthrough CNS Drugs, 84 NEURON 554 (2014) (analyzing 
the underdevelopment of drugs for CNS diseases and possible avenues for creating incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies). Notably, this does not mean that all pharmaceutical companies have been 
withdrawing from all CNS-related research projects. Id. at 555 (“[F]unding for CNS biotechnology 
companies from venture capital and other seed investors continues to be healthy.”); see SOEREN 
MATTKE ET AL., RAND PERSPECTIVES, THE NEW NEGLECTED DISEASES? POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
ARE NEEDED TO ENCOURAGE CNS DRUG DEVELOPMENT 1 (2013), http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE117/RAND_PE117.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZFK-2Q6Z] (argu-
ing that common CNS disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, and depression, are 
becoming “neglected” diseases, since drug R&D is not proportionate to their untreated disease burden 
and calling it a “disconnect between unmet need and investment”). 
 51 See MATTKE ET AL., supra note 50, at 1–2 (highlighting the health impacts from CNS disease); 
Choi et al., supra note 50, at 554 (describing “the stunning” economic impact of CNS diseases). 
 52 See Choi et al., supra note 50, at 555–56 (hypothesizing that “the main driver of the specific 
departures of companies from neuroscience research is [that] . . . . [t]he neuroscience sector is now 
widely considered to be less attractive than most other therapeutic sectors for research investment”); 
see also MATTKE ET AL., supra note 50, at 2–5 (analyzing the numerous financial disincentives that 
dissuade CNS drug development by private entities). 
 53 See Tom Blackwell, Why Some Pharma Companies Have Given up on Finding Alzheimer’s 
Treatments, Even as the Need Rises, NAT’L POST (Mar. 28, 2016), http://news.nationalpost.com/
health/why-some-pharma-companies-have-given-up-on-finding-an-alzheimers-treatment-even-as-the-
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Instead of confronting these major complex diseases with their massive 
public health burdens, the focus on profitability and the reluctance to assume 
risk has led many pharmaceutical companies to focus instead on niche markets 
for orphan diseases, where risks are lower and potential profits are high.54 
Markets for many non-lethal conditions that impair lifestyles in affluent econ-
omies have also proven to be lucrative. In the year 2000, for example, pharma-
ceutical companies were not engaged in a single R&D project aimed at tuber-
culosis—the leading lethal infectious disease globally—but there were eight 
R&D projects aimed at developing products for the treatment of erectile dys-
function and seven projects for baldness.55 
The prevalence of research projects intended to develop me-too drugs56—
or, as a top-manager in a major pharmaceutical company once called them: 
“me-slightly-different-marketed-like-hell” drugs—is yet another indication of 
the disconnect between private incentives and public healthcare needs.57 These 
me-too drugs are typically not clinically superior to earlier-developed already-
approved drugs, but their R&D costs are often lower than they would be for 
pioneer drugs, and are therefore developed with the hope of capturing a portion 
of the market from the earlier drug(s).58 Notable examples of areas character-
ized by a proliferation of me-too drugs include certain cholesterol lowering 
medication (“statins”), blood pressure lowering medication (“ACE inhibi-
tors”), and antidepressants (“SSRIs”).59 Although no pharmaceutical company 
                                                                                                                           
need-rises?__lsa=bc1e-1b90 [https://perma.cc/7MNR-V245] (reporting on cases of investment and 
substantial financial loss resulting from CNS drug development by pharmaceutical companies). 
 54 See Matthew Herder, What Is the Purpose of the Orphan Drug Act?, PLOS MED., Jan. 2017, at 
2 (highlighting the economic issues surrounding drug development and ways to reform the Orphan 
Drug Act). 
 55 See, e.g., BAKAN, supra note 19, at 49 (citing the statistics provided by Rachel Cohen). 
 56 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing me-too drugs). But see Aidan Hollis, Me-
Too Drugs: Is There a Problem?, WORLD HEALTH ORG., at 1 (Dec. 13, 2004), www.who.int/intellectual
property/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y988-TKUW] (reviewing the policy 
dispute regarding the pros and cons of me-too drugs and distinguishing between follow-on drugs that 
are clinically superior and/or were developed in parallel to earlier approved drugs and those that are 
true me-too drugs); Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, How Many “Me-Too” Drugs Is Too 
Many?, 305 JAMA 711, 711 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21325189 [https://perma.
cc/P9KQ-UUU3] (discussing possible potential advantages of me-too drugs). 
 57 See Bill Alpert, Roche’s Revolution, BARRON’S (Apr. 4, 2005), https://www.barrons.com/
articles/SB111239981733195958 [https://perma.cc/8NSP-EWC8] (quoting Bill Burns, the then chief 
of the pharmaceutical company Roche’s pharmaceutical division, arguing that the industry was trying 
to turn away from that business model). 
 58 This definition of me-too drugs, for purposes of the present discussion, is consistent with the 
one proposed by Aidan Hollis. See Hollis, supra note 56, at 1 (“I would suggest that a me-too drug is 
one that is approved after a pioneering drug and which is the ‘same,’ in the sense of the U.S. Orphan 
Drug Act, and is not clinically superior.”). 
 59 See, e.g., Gagne & Choudhry, supra note 56, at 711 (referring to the drug Pitavastatin (Livalo) 
as a me-too drug, being the eighth statin molecule approved in the United States and mentioning the 
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would claim to be pursuing a me-too drug, data published by regulatory au-
thorities regarding clinical superiority and scope of testing of approved new 
drug products makes it possible to estimate the proportion of drugs developed 
under a me-too business model.60 One 2003 estimate suggests that only 20% of 
the pharmaceutical companies’ R&D budget spent on clinical trials goes to-
ward the development of drugs that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
views as offering “significant improvement” over products already on the mar-
ket at the time of approval.61 The remaining 80% of that budget is left for the 
testing of products that do not offer significant clinical improvement.62 Anoth-
er analysis of new drugs and new indications of older drugs approved between 
1996 and 2006 found that most of them—at least 52.8% and, possibly, up to 
85.1%—did not represent any significant therapeutic advantage over already-
approved drugs.63 Comparable surveys of drugs approved in other countries 
had similar findings.64 Even conservative evaluation of this data indicates that 
me-too drugs comprise a majority of drugs approved. 
As the above examples illustrate, pharmaceutical companies prioritize 
their R&D efforts in a manner consistent with their mandate to maximize prof-
its, but expected profits are often not commensurate with the prevalence and 
severity of the underlying health conditions in need of treatments. As a result, 
choice of R&D projects by pharmaceutical companies often stands in stark, 
even macabre,65 contrast to public healthcare priorities and needs.66 
                                                                                                                           
classes of ACE inhibitors and SSRIs as other classes of drugs in which me-too products are common); 
Rosanne Spector, Me-Too Drugs: Sometimes They’re Just the Same Old, Same Old, STAN. MED. 
MAG., Summer 2005, http://sm.stanford.edu/archive/stanmed/2005summer/drugs-metoo.html [https://
perma.cc/G6XW-GBR4] (referring to AstraZenecca’s drug, Nexium, for the treatment of stomach and 
esophagus problems, as a me-too version of AstraZenecca’s own earlier stomach acid drug, Prilosec). 
 60 See HOLLIS, supra note 56, at 5 (discussing how data analytics helps to shed light on research 
spending regarding me-too drugs). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical 
Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 46 tbl.3 (2011). 
 64 See Derek J. Ward et al., How Innovative Are New Drugs Launched in the UK? A Retrospec-
tive Study of New Drugs Listed in the British National Formulary (BNF) 2001–2012, 4 BMJ OPEN, 
Sept. 2014, at 1, https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/4/10/e006235.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ERL8-3G67] (finding that only up to 26% of newly-launched drugs in the U.K. between 2001–2012 
were “highly innovative”); New Drugs and Indications in 2014, 24 PRESCRIRE INT’L 107, 109 (2015) 
(finding that out of 1,032 new drugs and indications approved in France in 2005–2014 only fifty-five 
had a clinical advantage over already-approved drugs and only nine could be considered breakthrough 
or as offering a real advantage over earlier drugs). 
 65 See, e.g., BAKAN, supra note 19, at 49 (“Pfizer and its shareholders make more money from 
drugs that treat baldness and impotence than they would from drugs to treat diseases, such as malaria 
and tuberculosis, that are leading causes of death in the developing world.”). 
 66 Some commentators argue that this reality is further evident in a dissociation between innova-
tion and profit in the pharmaceutical industry. See, e.g., Gagnon, supra note 9, at 573–74 (highlighting 
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B. Second Example: Non-Disclosure of Clinical Trials Information 
In order to bring a new drug to the market, pharmaceutical companies 
must undertake extensive clinical testing to prove that the drug is safe and ef-
fective. These clinical trials yield valuable information about the nature and 
properties of the drug, its effectiveness or lack thereof, and its side effects. 
Clinical trials, in which the safety and efficacy of drug products are tested, are 
time consuming, expensive, and extensive, and they often include hundreds, 
sometimes thousands, of human subjects. The data collected in these trials, 
typically spanning many thousands of pages, is selectively provided to regula-
tors solely for the purpose of trying to get the drug approved for sale.67 Yet, 
even though the societal value of this data—especially the data not shared with 
regulators—far exceeds its utility as a mere means of regulatory evaluation of 
drug products, the private incentives of companies drive them to limit the dis-
closure, publication, and use of this data.68 Again, the private incentives of 
companies stand in stark contrast to the public interest in complete and wide-
spread dissemination of all the data collected. 
One source of divergence between the private incentives and the public 
interest as they pertain to the disclosure of clinical data lies in the tension be-
tween private interests in providing information that will support drug approv-
al and the public interest in a full understanding of not only the benefits, but 
also the risks, of the drug. Commentators have explained that: 
Systematic reviews of published randomized clinical trials . . . are 
considered the gold standard source of synthesized evidence for in-
terventions, but their conclusions are vulnerable to distortion when 
trial sponsors have strong interests that might benefit from suppress-
ing or promoting selected data. More reliable evidence synthesis 
would result from systematic reviewing of clinical study reports—
standardized documents representing the most complete record of 
                                                                                                                           
the disconnect between financial incentives for pharmaceutical companies and the health of the pub-
lic). 
 67 See, e.g., Peter Doshi et al., The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: Recommendations 
from the Tamiflu Experience, 9 PLOS MED., Apr. 2012, at 1–2, https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/
article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001201&type=printable [https://perma.cc/L8ZY-HKPV] (high-
lighting the issue of bias in clinical data provided for drug development and approval by analyzing the 
case of Tamiflu). 
 68 See Editorial, Bring Out Your Dead, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, Jan. 2015, at 1 (calling for 
disclosure of information regarding failed compounds so as to enable their repurposing); Joshua M. 
Sharfstein et al., Blueprint for Transparency at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration: Recommen-
dations to Advance the Development of Safe and Effective Medical Products, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
(SUPP.) 11–12 (2017) (listing additional constituencies who would be interested in disclosure of addi-
tional clinical information). 
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the planning, execution, and results of clinical trials, which are sub-
mitted by industry to government drug regulators.69 
These commentators have further warned that “[e]vidence-based medicine is 
valuable to the extent that the evidence base is complete and unbiased. Selec-
tive publication of clinical trials—and the outcomes within those trials—can 
lead to unrealistic estimates of drug effectiveness and alter the apparent risk-
benefit ratio.”70 For these reasons, scientists, doctors, and policymakers have 
uniformly been calling for the full disclosure of clinical trials information.71 
As a general rule, however, pharmaceutical companies are not required to 
share much of this information with each other or with the public.72 Thus, de-
spite the recognized value of independent evaluation of clinical trials infor-
mation, pharmaceutical companies have not been sharing their clinical trials 
data and reports with third-party researchers.73 Furthermore, pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See, e.g., Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 2 box 1 (illustrating by listing numerous findings and 
understandings that would not have been available without access to Tamiflu clinical study reports 
and mentioning other drugs for which previously unpublished clinical trials data “radically changed 
public knowledge of safety and efficacy,” including Avandia, Neurontin, and Vioxx). 
 70 Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Ap-
parent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 252 (2008). 
 71 See, e.g., High-Level Panel on Access to Health Technologies, Report of the United Nations 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicine, at 36 (Sept. 2016), https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1a3ef761/t/57d9c6ebf5e231b2f02cd3d4/1473890031320/
UNSG+HLP+Report+FINAL+12+Sept+2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D85-KJJ2] (arguing for disclo-
sure of assessments regarding health technologies); WHO Statement on Public Disclosure of Clinical 
Trial Results, WORLD HEALTH ORG., at 1–3 (2015), http://www.who.int/ictrp/results/WHO_
Statement_results_reporting_clinical_trials.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/Z46J-AXNA] (suggesting 
public access to information for clinical trials through a registry); Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 5 
(calling also for pharmaceutical companies’ sharing of information not submitted to regulators). See 
generally INST. OF MED. ET AL., SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZ-
ING RISK (2015) (arguing for greater access to clinical trial information to increase effective treat-
ments); Harlan M. Krumholz et al., Data Acquisition, Curation, and Use for a Continuously Learning 
Health System, (Nat’l Acad. of Med. Vital Directions for Health and Heath Care Series, Discussion 
Paper, Sept. 19, 2016), https://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Data-Acquisition-Curation-and-
Use-for-a-Continuously-Learning-Health-System.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP6V-SRLS] (arguing that 
increased transparency and access to health information would lead to better, and more efficient, pa-
tient outcomes). 
 72 See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellec-
tual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 51–
57 (2009) (arguing that clinical trial data should be treated as a public good). 
 73 See, e.g., Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 2 (noting there are only three such regulatory researchers); 
Vasee S. Moorthy et al., Rationale for WHO’s New Position Calling for Prompt Reporting and Public 
Disclosure of Interventional Clinical Trial Results, 12 PLOS MED., Apr. 2015, at 1, https://journals.
plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001819&type=printable [https://perma.
cc/298P-VK8R] (reviewing literature on partial disclosure of clinical trial information). Notably, some 
pharmaceutical companies, namely GlaxoSmithKline and Johnson & Johnson, have taken steps to 
make some of their clinical trials information available to independent researchers under certain con-
ditions. Sharfstein et al., supra note 68, at 18. 
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companies have been known to provide only some of their clinical trials data 
to regulatory authorities.74 Where pharmaceutical companies publish clinical 
trials results in scientific literature, they do so highly selectively and are signif-
icantly more inclined to publicize trial results favorable to their products while 
avoiding publishing unfavorable results (and, where publishing, avoiding the 
characterization as unfavorable results).75 
Pundits have decried pharmaceutical companies’ nondisclosure of clinical 
trials information, arguing that they “waste resources and the contributions of 
investigators and study participants, and they hinder the advancement of medi-
cal knowledge”76 and that making clinical studies information inaccessible to 
the public is unethical.77 Commentators have been especially wary of partial 
disclosure and mischaracterization of clinical trials information in publications 
sponsored by pharmaceutical companies as overly complementary, which 
might “alter[] the apparent risk-benefit ratio of drugs . . . lead[ing] doctors to 
make inappropriate prescribing decisions that may not be in the best interest of 
their patients and, thus, the public health.”78 
Pharmaceutical companies have, in turn, responded with the following 
defenses of their practices, arguing that clinical study reports and results: (1) 
are confidential commercial information, because they potentially have sub-
stantial economic value for generic manufacturers and other competitors;79 (2) 
might deter participation in early-stage clinical trials;80 (3) might compromise 
patient anonymity;81 (4) are properly and sufficiently reviewed by regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See, e.g., Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 2, 4 (referring to at least fifteen trials for which Roche 
did not provide regulators with full study reports). 
 75 See Turner et al., supra note 70, at 252, 254–56 (finding that “whether the studies were pub-
lished and, if so, how the results were reported were strongly related to their overall outcomes”); see 
also WHO Statement on Public Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results, supra note 71, at 1 (“Multiple 
analyses have confirmed that a substantial number of clinical trials remain unreported several years 
after study completion, even in the case of large randomized clinical trials.”) 
 76 Turner et al., supra note 70, at 259 (stating in the context of selective publication of antidepres-
sants’ clinical trial results). 
 77 See Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 5 (noting that there are compelling arguments for making 
clinical data available). 
 78 Turner et al., supra note 70, at 259; see Ben Goldacre, How to Get All Trials Reported: Audit, 
Better Data, and Individual Accountability, 12 PLOS MED., Apr. 2015, at 1–2, https://journals.plos.
org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001821&type=printable [https://perma.cc/
EUF8-Z57K] (discussing issues with clinical result disclosure). 
 79 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws and Secrecy in Medical 
Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483, 489 (2007) (argu-
ing this rationale has been used over broadly). 
 80 See id. (critiquing and debunking this claim). 
 81 See Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 4 tbl.2 (contesting Roche’s claim that patient information 
would be compromised by suggesting data anonymization). 
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authorities worldwide;82 (5) are being sufficiently reported in the scientific lit-
erature;83 and more.84 These concerns and responses have been largely ad-
dressed and discredited by commentators and regulators alike, but it has had a 
limited impact on the disclosure practices of pharmaceutical companies.85 
Dissatisfaction with industry information sharing and disclosure practices 
has led to a regulatory change in European requirements. In 2014, the Europe-
an Medicines Agency (“EMA”) announced that it intended to start publishing 
clinical data, including clinical reports and individual patient data, submitted 
by pharmaceutical companies under EMA’s Centralised Marketing Authorisa-
tion procedure.86 EMA currently makes such data available through its web-
site.87 In the United States, in contrast, although pharmaceutical companies are 
required to make public certain information regarding clinical trials,88 the FDA 
and NIH do not currently require disclosure of full clinical datasets or clinical 
study reports.89 Accordingly, a lot of clinical information from studies con-
ducted prior to 2015 in the EU and virtually all clinical data submitted to the 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. (quoting Roche’s assertion that the information is made available to an extensive list of 
members of the scientific community). 
 83 Id. at 5 tbl.3. 
 84 Sharfstein et al., supra note 68, at 19–20 (describing, explaining, and responding to industry 
objections). 
 85 As described by one group of commentators: “If drug companies have legitimate reasons for 
maintaining the status quo of treating all of their data as trade secret, we have yet to hear them. We are 
all ears.” Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 3 tbls.2, 5 (describing and responding to reasons given by the 
pharmaceutical company Roche for not providing clinical trials data for Tamiflu); see Sharfstein et al., 
supra note 68, at 19–20 (responding to potential objections). 
 86 European Medicines Agency Policy on Publication of Clinical Data for Medicinal Products for 
Human Use, at 1–3, EMA/240810/2013 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.ema.europa.eu/documents/other/
european-medicines-agency-policy-publication-clinical-data-medicinal-products-human-use_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C7QW-RY43]. Notably, this EMA policy is currently subject to an ongoing legal 
challenge. See Case C-513/16 P(R), European Meds. Agency v. PTC Therapeutics Int’l Ltd., 2017 
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 148 (Mar. 1, 2017) (appellate court order dismissing the EMA’s appeal of 
the interim injunction); Case T-718/15 R, PTC Therapeutics Int’l Ltd. v. European Meds. Agency, 
2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 326 (July 20, 2016) (interim injunction issued by lower court). 
 87 Clinical Data, EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, https://clinicaldata.ema.europa.eu/web/cdp/home 
[https://perma.cc/HA8T-WQ9R]. 
 88 FDA’s Role: ClinicalTrials.gov Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.
gov/scienceresearch/specialtopics/runningclinicaltrials/fdasroleclinicaltrials.govinformation/default.
htm [https://perma.cc/Y5WN-QN9P]. The information is published on the website www.Clinical
Trials.gov. See Gagnon, supra note 9, at 574 (“In the U.S. . . . all clinical trials are required to disclose 
their protocols and results in a national registry in order to reduce the systematic selective reporting of 
clinical trial results.”). 
 89 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(c), (e)(2) (2017); see Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 79, at 483 (“[E]vi-
dence suggests that such registries remain incomplete.”); Sharfstein et al., supra note 68, at 15 (high-
lighting the need for increased transparency and disclosure regulation). Since 2010, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) has been reevaluating its own transparency policies. See Sharfstein et al., 
supra note 68, at 12–18 (recommending measures for increasing the transparency of FDA work in 
general and sharing of clinical information, in particular recommendations 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, and 18). 
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FDA90 remain unpublished and, for the most part, inaccessible to the scientific 
community and the public. Further, it is estimated that the results of about half 
of all clinical studies ever carried out have never been reported.91 The societal 
cost of this non-disclosure and selective-disclosure of clinical information can-
not be overstated.92 
The sharing of clinical trials data and publication of trial outcomes thus il-
lustrate a second example of the disconnect between the public interest (in full 
disclosure) and the private interests of pharmaceutical companies (in limited, 
selective, commercially-oriented disclosure of such data). 
C. Third Example: Drug Pricing 
Once pharmaceutical products are approved for marketing, the companies 
that make them must decide how to price them. In explaining such pricing de-
cisions, pharmaceutical companies have traditionally referred to the high costs 
and large risks involved in the R&D of pharmaceutical products,93 which, de-
spite being the subject of much controversy,94 are widely agreed to be very 
                                                                                                                           
 90 The FDA, has persistently held that clinical data submitted to the agency is proprietary infor-
mation and, as such, is not subject to disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 
requests. See Doshi et al., supra note 67, at 2 (chronicling the FDA’s response to FOIA requests). 
 91 Carolina Riveros et al., Timing and Completeness of Trial Results Posted at ClinicalTrials.gov 
and Published in Journals, 10 PLOS MED., Dec. 2013, at 6, https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/
article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001566&type=printable [https://perma.cc/R9YS-ZG6Z] (citing 
a previous study showing that less than half of all completed trials registered at ClinicalTrials.gov 
were published). 
 92 See LIVES ON THE EDGE, supra note 32, at 19 (“[Non-disclosure of clinical information] leads 
to adverse patient outcomes with tremendous financial, social and health consequences.”). 
 93 See Jonathan D. Rockoff, 5 Things to Know About How Drug Prices Are Set, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/12/08/5-things-to-know-about-how-drug-prices-are-
set/ [https://perma.cc/5SVE-6D24] (depicting Pfizer’s process for price-setting a cancer drug). 
 94 See High-Level Panel on Access to Health Technologies, supra note 71, at 35–36 (analyzing 
the myriad issues resulting from the lack of transparency concerning pharmaceutical drug develop-
ment); Jerry Avorn, The $2.6 Billion Pill—Methodologic and Policy Considerations, 372 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1877, 1877–79 (2015) (describing the lack of transparency in pharmaceutical companies’ for-
mulas for price setting); Amy Maxmen, Big Pharma’s Cost-Cutting Challenger, 536 NATURE 388, 
390 (2016) (asserting that the development of a new drug costs between $110–170 million and chal-
lenging the alleged myth that such costs run as high as $1.4 billion); Ben Hirschler, GlaxoSmithKline 
Boss Says New Drugs Can Be Cheaper, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
glaxosmithkline-prices/glaxosmithkline-boss-says-new-drugs-can-be-cheaper-idUSBRE92D0RM
20130314 [https://perma.cc/C5BX-MBUH] (noting the uncertainty surrounding a pharmaceutical 
drug’s price tag); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 
51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 426 (2014) (arguing that the figure of over $1 billion as the average cost 
of the development of a new drug is a schema which serves to propagate cognitive biases regarding 
the kind of incentives necessary for the continued development of new drugs). Pharmaceutical com-
panies, however, have been vehemently resistant to disclosure of the costs of their R&D efforts. See 
Light & Warburton, supra note 63, at 35 (discussing the gray formulas by which pharmaceutical com-
panies calculate research and development costs); Ed Silverman, Angry Over Drug Prices, More 
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high.95 The need to recoup investment costs and incentivize the continued in-
vestment of capital in subsequent R&D projects has been used to justify high 
drug prices. 
The reality of determining drug prices, however, is more nuanced than 
this return on investment and incentives story would suggest. Although phar-
maceutical companies no doubt consider their costs of development in drug 
pricing, drug price determinations are more often guided by market considera-
tions such as the cost of competing or alternative treatments, the likelihood that 
physicians would prescribe a certain drug at a certain price-point, and re-
strictions that health insurers might impose that could limit physicians from 
prescribing the drug.96 Pharmaceutical companies themselves have acknowl-
edged that their drug pricing decisions are the result of a “holistic” assessment, 
over a longer timeframe, of therapies’ benefits not only to patients but also to 
payers and health systems in general.97 In other words, pricing depends a great 
deal on what the market will pay. 
This should come as no surprise. Indeed, setting drug prices based on the 
ability of the company to extract profits is exactly what we would expect from 
traditional corporations with their focus on shareholder value. From a corpo-
rate-governance point of view, pharmaceutical companies have been doing 
commendably well for their shareholders98 and should be praised for good 
economic performance.99 
                                                                                                                           
States Push Bills for Pharma to Disclose Costs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/
pharmalot/2015/04/24/angry-over-drug-prices-more-states-push-bills-for-pharma-to-disclose-costs/ 
[https://perma.cc/7824-2RVT] (reporting on drug-makers efforts to halt legislative proposals which 
would make price-setting for pharmaceutical drugs more transparent).  
 95 Even the lowest estimates of drug development costs speak of many tens or even a few hun-
dreds of millions of dollars per successful development project. See, e.g., Maxmen, supra note 94, at 
390 (documenting the hundreds of millions of dollars the Drugs for Neglected Disease Initiative, a 
non-profit, estimates to incur in developing a new drug, even though it has economic advantages that 
for-profit organizations do not). 
 96 See Rockoff, supra note 93 (documenting Pfizer’s considerations when setting a cancer drug’s 
price). See generally Robert Langreth, How Gilead Priced Its $20 Billion Blockbuster, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-10/behind-the-1-000-pill-a-
formula-for-profits-inside-gilead [https://perma.cc/63Q7-BQ6P] (describing how Gilead came to price 
a pharmaceutical drug); Jonathan D. Rockoff, The Anatomy of a Drug Price: How Pfizer Chose to Set 
the Cost of Its Breast-Cancer Drug at $9,850 a Month, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2015, at A1 (analyzing 
Pfizer’s process for price-setting a new cancer drug).  
 97 See Bronwyn Mixter, Greater Transparency on Drug Prices Needed, Lawmakers Told, BNA 
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.bna.com/greater-transparency-drug-n57982068539/ [https://
perma.cc/TN57-7TW8] (reporting responses by PhRMA and BIO to calls for further transparency on 
drug pricing). 
 98 According to Aaron Kesselheim and Ameet Sarpatwari, “The top eleven drug manufacturers 
made $711 billion from 2003 to 2012, including $68 billion in 2012 alone, translating to an industry 
profit margin on par with the banking sector.” Aaron S. Kesselheim & Ameet Sarpatwari, To Spur 
Medical Innovation, Make Corporate Cheaters Pay, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Apr. 30, 2015), http://
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Yet, high drug prices have been met with anything but praise in the public 
arena. Critics of the pharmaceutical industry, of which there are many, have 
characterized pricing decisions as dictated by “what the market would bear,”100 
as opposed to the more palatable criteria such as the cost of manufacturing101 
and the drugs’ therapeutic value.102 Media reports of high prices charged by 
pharmaceutical companies for their products103 and pharmaceutical price 
hikes104 are met with public outcry and angered reactions from pundits and 
                                                                                                                           
healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/04/30/to-spur-medical-innovation-make-corporate-cheaters-pay/ [https://
perma.cc/F3GB-QU7U]. 
 99 This, at least, is the sentiment within the industry, or as aptly put by a pharmaceutical compa-
ny’s spokesperson: “Our duty is to our shareholders and to maximize the value [of our products]. . . . 
Sometimes pricing comes into it, sometimes volume comes into it.” Jonathan Rockoff & Ed Silver-
man, Pharmaceutical Companies Buy Rivals’ Drugs, Then Jack up the Prices, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pharmaceutical-companies-buy-rivals-drugs-then-jack-up-the-
prices-1430096431 [https://perma.cc/ZD2C-3DFF]. 
 100 See Editorial, Costly Hepatitis C Drugs for Everyone?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/opinion/costly-hepatitis-c-drugs-for-everyone.html [https://perma.cc/
97DC-HQ6X] (reporting on the public need for Hepatitis C medication and the factors regarding its 
expensive price-tag); see also Alpern et al., supra note 15, at 1859–61 (explaining sharp and rapid 
increases in the prices of off-patent and generic medicines as resulting from low levels of competition 
in markets for such medicines); Jack Scannell, Four Reasons Drugs Are Expensive, of Which Two Are 
False, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/10/13/four-
reasons-drugs-are-expensive-of-which-two-are-false/#4aa024164c3b [https://perma.cc/9MK2-VC47] 
(suggesting that drugs are priced based on numerous factors not associated with actual cost or value); 
Silverman, supra note 94 (quoting an industry-backed research institute saying that “[p]ricing strate-
gies are based on therapeutic value, market size, usage, patent life, competition and other factors”). 
 101 See Light & Warburton, supra note 63, at 34–35 (noting the drug industry’s frequently reiter-
ated rationale for high drug prices, high development costs); see, e.g., The Pharmafocus Debate: Is 
the Price of New Hepatitis C Treatments Fair?, PHARMAFILE (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.pharmafile.
com/news/396162/pharmafocus-debate-price-new-hepatitis-c-treatments-fair [https://perma.cc/2QQV-
3T8Y] (“The high price [of hepatitis C drug, Sovaldi] is completely unrelated to the cost of manufac-
ture . . . .”). 
 102 See David H. Howard et al., Pricing in the Market for Anticancer Drugs, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 
139, 140, 148–49 (2015) (reviewing literature making the argument that “[t]he launch prices of new 
anticancer drugs and other drugs in the so-called ‘specialty’ pharmaceutical market have been increas-
ing over time and . . . are unrelated to the magnitude of the expected health benefits,” and calculating 
the average cancer drug to cost $65,900 in 2013, for which the average survival benefit was 0.46 years 
and the price per life-year to be $207,000, as compared to $139,100 in 2005 and $54,100 in 1995). 
 103 See, e.g., Tracy Staton, Amgen Slaps $178K Price on Rare New Leukemia Drug Blincyto, 
FIERCEPHARMA (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/amgen-slaps-178k-price-
on-rare-new-leukemia-drug-blincyto [https://perma.cc/7PBY-EGYJ] (reporting Amgen’s pricing of 
their leukemia treatment drug, Blincyto, at $178,000, Merck & Co.’s skin cancer drug, Keytruda, at 
about $150,000/year, and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.’s skin cancer drug, Yervoy, at $120,000 per 
course); Editorial, Another Drug Pricing Ripoff, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2016, at A18 (criticizing the 
surge in cost for EpiPen devices, which was fueled seemingly by a thirst for increased profits); Edito-
rial, Runaway Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2015, at A22 (documenting the fight to harness sky-
high drug prices through Congress). 
 104 See Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, Competition, Generics Not Always Limiting Drug Costs, BNA 
NEWS (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.bna.com/competition-generics-not-n57982077535/ [https://
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politicians alike.105 These reactions are equally unsurprising given that the high 
prices of drugs have resulted in diminished access to therapies (often due to 
insufficient insurance coverage), leading to increased morbidity and mortality 
among patients as well as increases in both public expenditures on healthcare 
and in the cost of health insurance.106 
A highly publicized case-in-point is the old, little-known antibiotic drug, 
Daraprim (pyrimethamine), which is used for the treatment of certain very 
specific infections,107 and which has been on the market since 1953.108 In Au-
gust 2015, the pharmaceutical company, Turing Pharmaceuticals,109 bought the 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/34EX-D5ZC] (reporting price hikes of some old drugs that used to be sold at very low pric-
es, subsequent to consolidations in the markets for these drugs). 
 105 See, e.g., Letter from Senator Bernard Sanders and Representative Elijah Cummings to Sylvia 
Burwell, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/down
load/joint-letter-to-hhs?inline=file [https://perma.cc/AAX6-DUYJ]) [hereinafter Letter from Sanders 
and Cumings] (calling for the federal government to regulate staggering generic drug costs); see also 
Another Drug Pricing Ripoff, supra note 103 (“The rapid increase in the price of the EpiPen . . . has 
shocked consumers and lawmakers.”); Katherine Greifeld, Sanders, Cummings Blast Marathon for 
$89,000 Price on Old Drug, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-02-13/sanders-cummings-blast-marathon-for-89-000-price-on-old-drug [https://perma.cc/6EQJ-
CN3F] (reporting on Senator Sanders and Representative Cummings’ letter to Marathon’s CEO criti-
cizing the company’s drug prices). 
 106 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: INNOVATION, SPENDING, AND PATIENT ACCESS 
4–5, 12–13 (2016) (reporting that about 9.7% of adults ages 18–64 who participated in government 
healthcare programs in 2011–2014 did not take drugs as prescribed because of high out-of-pocket 
costs); Kesselheim et al., supra note 5, at 863 (reviewing scientific literature establishing connections 
between pharmaceutical price increases and increased patient nonadherence); Ayalew Tefferi et al., In 
Support of a Patient-Driven Initiative and Petition to Lower the High Price of Cancer Drugs, 90 
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 996, 997 (2015) (tracing the health consequences of unaffordable cancer drugs); 
Costly Hepatitis C Drugs for Everyone?, supra note 100 (highlighting the enormous costs associated 
with new drugs treating Hepatitis C); Kasia Lipska, Opinion, Break Up the Insulin Racket, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/opinion/sunday/break-up-the-insulin-
racket.html [https://perma.cc/8XTG-VMQD] (describing how rapid increases in the price of insulin 
products has been lowering their affordability and, consequently, increasing morbidity of diabetes 
patients); Letter from Sanders and Cummings, supra note 105 (describing how increases in drug pric-
es lower patient access to such drugs); Letter from the Nat’l Assoc. of Medicaid Dirs. to Chairmen 
and Ranking Members of Cong. Comms. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.medicaiddirectors.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/namd_sovaldi_letter_to_congress_10-28-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EF9-
9TRZ]) (addressing the significant risks and burdens associated with exorbitantly priced Hepatitis C 
medication). 
 107 Prescribing Information: DARAPRIM® (pyrimethamine) 25-mg Scored Tablets, GLAXO-
SMITHKLINE (2003), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2003/08578slr016_dara
prim_lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY3X-J6F3]. 
 108 According to the FDA Approved Drug Products database, Daraprim was originally approved 
for marketing on January 23, 1953. Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, New Drug Applica-
tion (NDA): 008578, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/
index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=008578 [https://perma.cc/C8GB-R96F]. 
 109 Notably, commentators have rejected the characterization of Turing Pharmaceuticals as a 
pharmaceutical company and argued that it was, essentially, an investment vehicle “masquerading as 
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rights to Daraprim and became the sole manufacturer of Daraprim at that 
time.110 Turing used its market power to raise the price of Daraprim from 
$13.50 to $750 per tablet practically overnight, bringing the cost of treatment 
for some patients to hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.111 Although 
Daraprim is indicated for a relatively narrow range of rather uncommon dis-
eases (at least in the United States), patients who tend to need Daraprim belong 
to an especially vulnerable group of patients, many of whom are immunocom-
promised and suffer from other underlying serious medical conditions such as 
HIV, AIDS, and cancer.112 Daraprim’s price hike was met with an unprece-
dented public uproar, and Turing’s CEO was dubbed “the most hated man in 
America.”113 The company initially attempted to deflect the criticism and justi-
fy the price hike on the grounds that it was necessary for Turing to remain in 
business, that the increased earnings would be used for R&D, that the financial 
burden for patients and the healthcare system was not as great as was being 
argued, that the new price of Daraprim was not unusual for a drug for rare dis-
eases, and, finally, that “it [was] business” and that the company was “sup-
posed to make as much money as possible.”114 These explanations, acceptable 
                                                                                                                           
[a] pharmaceutical company[].” Editorial, No Justification for High Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 2015, at SR10. Setting aside questions of whether R&D activity is indeed a staple of a pharmaceu-
tical company, as observed by the editors of the New York Times, Turing’s conduct was not unchar-
acteristic of other companies generally viewed as part of the “pharmaceutical industry.” See, e.g., 
Cynthia Koons, Pfizer Raises Prices on 133 Drugs This Year, and It’s Not Alone, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
2, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02/pfizer-raised-prices-on-133-drugs-
this-year-and-it-s-not-alone [https://perma.cc/3UVP-7MM3] (showing that Turing Pharmaceuticals’ 
price hike, although significant, was not unusual among pharmaceutical companies). Nor was Tu-
ring’s business model or conduct unique in other ways. See Robert Langreth & Rebecca Spalding, 
Shkreli Was Right: Everyone’s Hiking Drug Prices, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/shkreli-not-alone-in-drug-price-spikes-as-skin-gel-soars-1-
860 [https://perma.cc/J7QV-479J] (discussing Turing’s purchase of Diaprim and subsequent sharp 
price increase); see also Rockoff & Silverman, supra note 99 (documenting a pharmaceutical compa-
ny’s arbitrary price increase of crucial heart medication shortly after purchasing the rights). 
 110 Andrew Pollack, Once a Neglected Treatment, Now an Expensive Specialty Drug, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2015, at B1. 
 111 Id. Notably, Daraprim’s original cost was about $1 per tablet and rose to $13.50 per tablet 
subsequent to increases starting in 2010 with Daraprim’s sale by its original owner and manufacturer, 
GlaxoSmithKline, and ending with the sale to Turing in August 2015. These price increases were 
accompanied by a marked drop in the prescription of Daraprim. Id. at B2. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See, e.g., Samantha Allen, Martin Shkreli Is Big Pharma’s Biggest A**hole, DAILY BEAST 
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/martin-shkreli-is-big-pharmas-biggest-ahole [https://
perma.cc/PWP3-L5V6] (chronicling the nation’s response to Martin Shkreli’s astronomical price 
increase of the life-saving drug, Daraprim); see also Joel Gallant, Get Rich Quick with Old Generic 
Drugs! The Pyrimethamine Pricing Scandal, 2 OPEN F. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Nov. 2015, at 1, 2, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4685150/ [https://perma.cc/66DY-DHZS] (condemn-
ing Martin Shkreli for his price-hike of Daraprim and attacking his responses to public criticism). 
 114 Clyde Haberman, Lives and Profits in the Balance: The High Stakes of Medical Patents, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/us/retro-report-medical-patents-profits.
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as they may have been from a corporate governance standpoint, did not quell 
the public outrage, and Turing’s CEO was subpoenaed to appear before Con-
gress to explain the Daraprim price hike.115 As could be expected, the Dara-
prim price hike had an immediate negative effect on patient access and public 
expenditures on prescriptions.116 Turing eventually lowered the price of Dara-
prim to $375 per pill, which it held out as a 50% reduction in price, but which 
doctors have characterized as “criminal” and “an immense financial burden for 
a drug that should be $1 a pill.”117 
The substantial increase in the price of EpiPen provides another well-
publicized example of the incongruity between pharmaceutical company deci-
sions about pricing and the public interest in sustainable access. EpiPen, which 
was approved in the late 1980s,118 is used to rapidly inject epinephrine to treat 
patients experiencing severe allergic reactions (anaphylaxis).119 In 2007, thirty 
years after EpiPen’s original marketing approval, the pharmaceutical company 
Mylan—a well-established global pharmaceutical company—acquired the 
right to make and sell EpiPen, which was then sold to pharmacies for less than 
$100 for a two-pen set.120 Leveraging its market power in this ubiquitous121 
                                                                                                                           
html [https://perma.cc/WP88-JGA3]; see Allen, supra note 113 (reporting on Martin Shkreli’s defense 
of the price-hike); Gallant, supra note 113, at 2 (criticizing Martin Shkreli’s justifications for the price 
increase). 
 115 Carolyn Y. Johnson, Shkreli Silent Before Panel, Far from Quiet on Twitter, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 5, 2016, at A14. 
 116 See Letter from Stephen B. Calderwood, President, Infectious Diseases Soc’y of America, and 
Adaora Adimora, Chair, HIV Med. Assoc., to Tom Evegan and Kevin Bernier, Turing Pharmaceuti-
cals (Sept. 8, 2015), https://sc.cnbcfm.com/applications/cnbc.com/resources/editorialfiles/2018/02/23/
HIVMA.IDSA_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJM4-UKD8]) (discussing the negative patient impact the 
price-hike would have); see also Heather Long, Here’s What Happened to AIDS Drug That Spiked 
5,000%, CNN BUS. (Aug. 25, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/25/news/economy/daraprim-
aids-drug-high-price/index.html [https://perma.cc/N8DE-UWER] (“As hospitals try to keep costs 
downs [sic], doctors have been discouraged from using Daraprim . . . . They have turned to alterna-
tives that aren’t nearly as well tested with unknown side effects.”); Meg Tirrell & Dan Mangan, Clin-
ton Calls Drug Price Hike ‘Outrageous,’ Vows Plan, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/
2015/09/21/clinton-calls-drug-price-hike-outrageous-vows-plan.html [https://perma.cc/E2B4-DDCW] 
(quoting the Infectious Diseases Society of America, which criticized the price increase as unjustifia-
ble and jeopardizing the health of patients in need of the drug). 
 117 See Long, supra note 116 (quoting Dr. Wendy Armstrong, medical professor at Emory Uni-
versity and head of the Infectious Diseases Program at Grady Health System in Atlanta, Georgia). 
 118 EpiPen was originally approved for marketing on December 22, 1987. See Drugs@FDA: FDA 
Approved Drug Products, New Drug Application (NDA): 019430, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=019430 
[https://perma.cc/EM9S-G6C9]. 
 119 See EPIPEN®, Full Prescribing Information, Indications and Usage, MYLAN SPECIALTY, L.P. 
(2018), https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/fda/fdaDrugXsl.cfm?setid=7560c201-9246-487c-
a13b-6295db04274a&type=display [https://perma.cc/7J32-6CPZ]. 
 120 Tara Parker-Pope & Rachel Rabkin Peachman, A Surge in the Price of EpiPens Is a Worry to 
Severe Allergy Sufferers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2016, at B1. 
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medical product,122 Mylan began to rapidly increase the price of EpiPens such 
that by May 2016, the cost for a two-pen set exceeded $600, raising Mylan’s 
sales from $200 million annually to over $1 billion.123 As a result, the cost of 
EpiPen for patients without insurance or with high-deductible insurance plans 
rose to up to $640 for a two-pen set, and even patients with relatively broad 
coverage saw significant increases in their copayments.124 This was also the 
case for educational institutions, which are often required to stock EpiPens as 
part of their first-aid provisions.125 Given that EpiPens expire after a year, the 
price increases put a strain on patients’ (and schools’) ability to afford what is 
essentially a lifesaving medicine.126 As with Daraprim, the price increases 
drew the ire of numerous lawmakers, including then-presidential-candidate, 
Hillary Clinton, who called it the “latest troubling example of a company tak-
ing advantage of its consumers.”127 Congress called upon the CEO of Mylan to 
provide explanations for the price increase.128 Mylan’s CEO, Heather Bresch, 
explained that Mylan had invested heavily in increasing awareness for EpiPen, 
that it was working on extending the product’s shelf life (so it would not have 
to be replaced annually), that Mylan’s profits were actually just $50 per pen 
out of the $600 or so per set, and that she “wish[ed] [Mylan] had better antici-
pated the . . . financial issues for a growing minority of patients who may have 
ended up paying the full . . . price or more.”129 She further announced several 
initiatives that were meant to make EpiPen more affordable, including launch-
                                                                                                                           
 121 Id.; see also Cynthia Koons & Robert Langreth, How Marketing Turned the EpiPen into a 
Billion-Dollar Business, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-09-23/how-marketing-turned-the-epipen-into-a-billion-dollar-business [https://perma.cc/KV4Q-
Q4FQ] (documenting EpiPen’s revitalization and growth as a result of marketing). 
 122 According to the Drugs@FDA database, NDA 019430 does not have any therapeutic equiva-
lents. EPIPEN®, Full Prescribing Information, Indications and Usage, supra note 119. 
 123 Koons & Langreth, supra note 121. 
 124 Parker-Pope & Rabkin Peachman, supra note 120, at B1. 
 125 Id. at B4. 
 126 See id. (highlighting a mother’s struggle in being able to afford to supply her child with an 
EpiPen). 
 127 Anna Edney, Clinton’s Attacks on Drug Prices Leave Health Stocks Reeling, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-24/clinton-s-attacks-on-drug-
pricing-leave-health-stocks-reeling [https://perma.cc/7S3G-R3NL]; see Another Drug Pricing Ripoff, 
supra note 103, at A18 (reporting on members of Congress who called for an investigation into 
Mylan); Hillary Clinton (@HillaryClinton), TWITTER (Sept. 2, 2016), https://twitter.com/hillary
clinton/status/771775910278291456 [https://perma.cc/N8QU-JF2R] (criticizing Mylan for the price-
hike and proposing a plan to stop such activities in the future). 
 128 Heather Bresch, Chief Exec. Off., Mylan, Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Sept. 21, 2016), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/2016-09-21-Mylan-CEO-Bresch-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKT2-
5LAF]. 
 129 Id.  
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ing an “authorized generic” version of EpiPen that would cost $300, about 
50% less than the $600 price tag.130 
These examples illustrate the tensions between a corporate mandate to 
maximize profits—in this case by raising prices—and public healthcare needs. 
Negotiation power imbalances, a staple of pharmaceutical markets,131 dictate 
that the scales are almost always tilted in favor of the pharmaceutical indus-
try’s interests in critical decisions throughout the drug discovery, development, 
and marketing lifecycle, with the interests of healthcare consumers in lowering 
morbidity and mortality coming in second.132 
D. Fourth Example: Delay of Entry of Competition into Product Markets 
Upon their approval and entry into the market, new pharmaceutical prod-
ucts typically benefit from one or more forms of protection from competition, 
including market, data, and other exclusivities available (often uniquely) to 
drug products.133 These exclusivity provisions are designed to allow pharma-
                                                                                                                           
 130 Id. Notably, the announcement of these plans was met with much skepticism and critique and 
did not entirely quell the ongoing public outcry. See, e.g., James Paton & Naomi Kresge, Why the 
$600 EpiPen Costs $69 in Britain, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
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 131 Negotiation power imbalances in pharmaceutical markets are typically the result of the accu-
mulation of market power by pharmaceutical companies. This, in turn, is a result of a variety of fac-
tors, primary among which are (1) robust government exclusivity regimes (such as patents and a varie-
ty of other exclusivities), (2) high market entry barriers (mostly in the form of FDA regulations), and 
(3) other government-imposed limitations on negotiation powers (for example, by disallowing Medi-
care to negotiate the price of pharmaceuticals). See, e.g., Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shel-
ters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 330–52 (2015) (discussing the numerous exclusivities available in pharma-
ceutical products); Chuck Shih et al., How Would Government Negotiation of Medicare Part D Drug 
Prices Work?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/01/how-
would-government-negotiation-of-medicare-part-d-drug-prices-work/ [https://perma.cc/79LZ-F2JX] 
(dissecting the scenarios and likely outcomes from hypothetical government negotiations regarding 
Medicare Part D drug prices). 
 132 See Michael E. Miller, ‘Pharma Bro’ Martin Shkreli and the Very American Debate Over 
Maximizing Profit, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/09/23/pharma-bro-martin-shkreli-and-the-very-american-debate-over-maximizing-
profit/?utm_term=.f306413d07c1 [https://perma.cc/7V6Y-KCPR] (“[W]hen companies are in the 
position to ask the highest possible price, and there is no opposition or measures against it, that’s what 
they’ll do. We’ve seen that with HIV, we’ve seen it with Hepatitis C, and we see it now with [Dara-
prim],” quoting Ellen ‘tHoen). 
 133 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2018) (creating five-year new chemical entity exclusiv-
ity); 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2018) (providing for seven-year orphan drug exclusivity); 35 U.S.C. 
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ceutical companies to recoup their R&D costs and earn sufficient profits to 
incentivize further investment in future R&D projects. The provisions are often 
highly successful in achieving these goals, enabling a highly profitable phar-
maceutical industry and spurring the emergence and development of whole 
new sectors within that industry dedicated to orphan products, biologics, ge-
neric products, and others.134 
Over the years, however, these exclusivity regimes and certain procedures 
of the regulatory agencies administering them have facilitated a range of 
pharmaceutical company practices often referred to as “product life cycle 
management” by the industry and “evergreening” by its critics.135 Despite sig-
nificant controversy surrounding the purpose and legitimacy of these practices, 
there is little dispute that they delay and sometimes even prevent competition 
in drug markets.136 These competition-limiting practices result in the imposi-
tion or prolongation of limits on patient access to pharmaceutical products, 
while at the same time serve to increase the revenue of pharmaceutical compa-
nies. The legal and economic literature is replete with accounts of such compe-
tition-limiting practices. Notable examples include reverse-payment settlement 
(“pay-for-delay”) agreements,137 product-hopping,138 abuse of the FDA’s Citi-
                                                                                                                           
§ 156 (2015) (covering patents and creating a unique term extension available to pharmaceutical 
products); 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2017) (providing twelve-year exclusivity for newly approved biologics). 
 134 See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Com-
petition in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation, 18 
INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 177, 198 (2011) (documenting over two decades of trends in market exclusivity 
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development while lowering costs); Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1993 (2007) (documenting the success of the Hatch-Waxman Amend-
ments in generating an expansive generic drug market); Frank R. Lichtenberg & Joel Waldfogel, Does 
Misery Love Company? Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan Drug 
Act, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 335, 348 (2009) (analyzing the market outcomes and 
impact on patients from the Orphan Drug Act); Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/developingproductsforrarediseases
conditions/default.htm [https://perma.cc/4QZX-4XA7 ] (chronicling the success of the Orphan Drug 
Designation Program in catalyzing the development of the orphan drug industry). 
 135 See Heled, supra note 131, at 341 n.177 (“Evergreening . . . is a term typically referring to a 
variety of practices of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers aimed at extending exclusivity peri-
ods for their products to maintain their revenue streams.”). 
 136 See generally Yaniv Heled, Follow-On Biologics Are Set up to Fail, 2018 ILL. L. REV. 113 
(noting wide-ranging efforts on behalf of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies to halt the devel-
opment of follow on biologic medicines); Gregory H. Jones et al., Strategies That Delay or Prevent 
the Timely Availability of Affordable Generic Drugs in the United States, 127 BLOOD 11 (2016), 
http://www.bloodjournal.org/content/bloodjournal/127/11/1398.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6QV-
QSZ5]. 
 137 Under reverse-payment settlement agreements, branded pharmaceutical manufacturers pay 
generic drug companies to delay entry of a generic drug into the market. See Jeannie Baumann, Bill 
Takes Aim at Branded Rx Companies’ Efforts to Stall Generics, BNA NEWS (June 16, 2016), https://
www.bna.com/bill-takes-aim-n57982074280/ [https://perma.cc/J635-AF4N] (discussing the Creating 
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zens Petition procedure,139 and refusal to sell drug samples to generic compa-
nies for bioequivalence studies.140 
The merits and legitimacy of specific instances of competition-limiting 
practices may be subject to debate, but, their ubiquity and effect on access141 
make competition-limiting practices yet another example of industry practices 
that are at odds with public health needs. 
E. Application Beyond Pharma: The Pervasive Disconnect Between 
Shareholder Value and Public Health Value 
Pharmaceutical companies are increasingly portrayed as “heartless” and 
cynical, even evil. Indeed, it was telling that the conduct of pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                           
and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (“CREATES”) Act (S. 3056), which sought to tackle 
such conduct by branded drug-makers); Bronwyn Mixter, No Dearth of Legislation on Tackling High 
Drug Costs, BNA NEWS (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.bna.com/no-dearth-legislation-n57982083458/ 
[https://perma.cc/SDU9-A9J9] (discussing the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 124)). 
 138 Product hopping occurs when a drug manufacturer seeks to shift patients from a drug that is near-
ing expiration of its exclusivity term to a successor drug with more exclusivity remaining whereas the 
successor drug typically includes minor non-therapeutic changes to the original, earlier drug, such as in 
dosage or dosage form. Upon approval of its successor drug for use by the relevant patient population, 
the manufacturer then removes the original product from the market before generic rivals can enter the 
market for the original drug. CHIEMI SUZUKI ET AL., BLOOMBERG PHARM. L. & INDUS. REP., THE LONG 
AND WINDING ROAD FOR BIOSIMILARS: CHARTING A PATHWAY THROUGH PATENT, FDA, ANTI-
TRUST, PRESCRIPTION FILLING, REIMBURSEMENT AND LIABILITY LAW 10 (2015); see e.g., Mylan 
Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421, 438 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court’s 
finding of “product hopping,” but holding that it did not rise to the level of anticompetitive behavior 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act); Vincent C. Capati & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Product Life-
Cycle Management as Anticompetitive Behavior: The Case of Memantine, 22 J. MANAGED CARE & 
SPECIALTY PHARMACY 339, 339 (2016) (describing the process of a “product hop”); Dmitry Karshtedt, 
The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the FDA, IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (proposing a novel way of addressing product hopping and related problems). 
 139 See Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen Petitions with 
the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 118 (2013) (analyzing how the citizen petition process is utilized by 
pharmaceutical drug manufactures to stall generic competitors); Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, 
Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2016) (find-
ing that citizen petitions, in some circumstances, raise serious anticompetitive issues). 
 140 Some branded manufacturers have been accused of abusing certain distribution restrictions 
placed on their products by refusing to provide samples of such products to generic manufacturers for 
bioequivalence testing, thereby impeding generic manufacturers’ ability to establish equivalence of 
their generic versions of such drug products. Henry N. Butler, REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution 
Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential Generic Competitors, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 977, 985 (2015); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Amicus Brief: Improper Use 
of Restricted Drug Distribution Programs May Impede Generic Competition (June 19, 2014), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/ftc-amicus-brief-improper-use-restricted-drug-
distribution [https://perma.cc/4FF6-PKK9]). 
 141 As mentioned above, by definition, competition-limiting practices inevitably lead to decreased 
patient access to pharmaceutical products (and therefore increased patient morbidity and/or mortality) 
and increases in pharmaceutical companies’ revenues. 
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companies was one of the only issues on which both candidates in the recent 
2016 presidential election agreed.142 Pharmaceutical companies are, however, 
reaching their decisions based on their goal of maximizing shareholder value, a 
goal that is supported by U.S. corporate law along with well-established norms 
of corporate behavior. Their executives, moreover, are routinely rewarded for 
reaching profit goals even at the expense of public health. 
Although we use the pharmaceutical industry as an illustration of just 
how pervasive and costly the market disconnect can be for public health, even 
very different types of markets, such as markets for health services, nursing 
homes, and markets for medical devices, share common characteristics (as fur-
ther discussed in Part II) that allow for the divergence of private profit-driven 
decisions and public health needs. 
Recent studies focus on the role of sky-high prices for everything from 
prescriptions to physicians’ services as an explanation for why the United 
States spends twice as much on healthcare with worse results.143 Private com-
panies focused on profit have little interest in reducing the price they charge 
and also little interest in reducing the prices they pay where the cost can be shift-
ed to consumers or taxpayers and competition is limited. Private health insurers, 
for instance, earn record profits by shifting to high-cost deductible plans and 
limiting their coverage of those patients requiring the most healthcare. The high 
cost of health insurance recently drove Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and JP 
Morgan to try their own experiment at providing healthcare for their employ-
ees with a company that will be “free from profit-making incentives and con-
straints.”144 The increasing shift of formerly not-for-profit companies in certain 
markets, such as the market for health insurance, to become for-profit corpora-
tions, and the active role of private investment in hospitals and physician ser-
                                                                                                                           
 142 Then President-elect Donald Trump said that pharmaceutical companies are “getting away 
with murder” and Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton said, “It’s wrong when drug 
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com/2017/01/11/trump-drug-prices-biotech-stocks/ [https://perma.cc/V7QA-W73Q]; see Nick Fletcher, 
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 143 See Jay Hancock & Shefali Luthra, High Deductibles Are Forcing Employees to Pay More 
Out of Pocket, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016), http://time.com/money/4494938/high-deductible-health-plans-
employee-costs/ [https://perma.cc/UUC3-XJKW] (reporting on rising deductibles for employees’ 
health insurance). See generally Papanicolas et al., supra note 30 (summarizing excessive U.S. spend-
ing on healthcare and its mediocre health outcomes). 
 144 Richard Master, Amazon’s Health Care Experiment Shows Exactly Why We Need Medicare for 
All, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/02/07/amazon-health-
care-experiment-shows-why-we-need-medicare-all-richard-master-column/309251002/ [https://perma.
cc/A2DB-T7ES] (arguing that the profit focus of insurance companies leads to higher premiums and 
large out of pocket expenses and expenditures on sales, marketing, and administrative overhead). 
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vices, suggest that the profit incentive and the potential for disconnect are only 
growing. 
The corporate practices discussed above highlight the disconnect that 
arises when healthcare decisions are made by private companies focused on 
profit maximization. Expecting for-profit healthcare companies to voluntarily 
put the interests of patients before those of their own shareholders is, in effect, 
expecting them to act in ways that are both inconsistent with well-established 
norms of corporate behavior and possibly even risky in light of legal duties and 
the possibility of corporate takeover. In Part II, we examine the market condi-
tions that allow for this disconnect. 
II. WHY TRADITIONAL CORPORATIONS ARE ILL-SUITED FOR  
HEALTHCARE MARKETS 
Healthcare markets are different from other markets as a practical matter 
and they should be treated differently as a policy matter. The distinctive charac-
teristics of these markets, as described below, produce sub-optimal social wel-
fare outcomes when products and services are developed and sold by private 
entities, such as corporations, that focus primarily on profit-maximization.145 
In this Part, we focus on three characteristics that distinguish healthcare 
markets in ways that make traditional profit-focused models of healthcare pro-
duction problematic. We explain how these characteristics allow for a diver-
gence of private incentives and public health needs when traditional corpora-
tions are left to produce and price healthcare products and services. 
A. Healthcare Market Failures 
Producers in a market-based system make production and pricing deci-
sions in response to (1) consumer demand and willingness to pay; (2) their 
own costs of production; and (3) competition from other producers. In a simple 
neoclassical world, the outcome is an efficient one.146 Private companies com-
pete with each other in the price and quality of their goods and services in ef-
forts to maximize profits. Profit reflects both supply costs and consumer de-
mand, and competition pushes prices down until supra-normal profits are elim-
inated and goods are provided at prices that equate the cost of production and 
value of consumption for the marginal unit produced. Although the neoclassi-
                                                                                                                           
 145 See, e.g., Karshtedt, supra note 138 (finding that numerous factors lead to the practice of 
product hopping by pharmaceutical companies). 
 146 See Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 803, 804 (2008) (referring to “the neoclassical conclusion that competitive markets . . . will 
generate a mix of goods and services that is superior to those that can be generated with various forms 
of government regulation”). 
106 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:73 
cal assumptions required for perfectly competitive markets are rarely, if ever, 
satisfied, operating via the market continues to be viewed as an efficient means 
of meeting consumer needs under most circumstances in developed market 
economies such as the United States.147 Arguments for government interven-
tion into the operation of the market are limited primarily to redistributive con-
cerns or situations of clear market failure, such as the underproduction of pub-
lic goods, natural monopolies, or the presence of externalities.148 
Few commentators would disagree that healthcare markets are not per-
fectly competitive, and many would agree that the government has some role 
to play in the healthcare market. Yet, there remains much disagreement over 
the magnitude, nature, and sources of the failure(s) of healthcare markets as 
well as over what the appropriate policy responses should be.149 We focus here 
on the market conditions that make relying on profit-focused companies to 
produce healthcare products and services to meet public health needs problem-
atic. 
Corporations in healthcare markets, like corporations in other markets, 
make their decisions based primarily on maximizing shareholder value, which 
involves maximizing revenue streams from their portfolio of products and ser-
vices over time. The time frame over which to optimize shareholder value is 
determined in part by investors for private companies and the stock market for 
public companies. In the case of public companies, managing a company’s 
stock price becomes an additional important driver of corporate decision-
making, with executive compensation structures often exacerbating existing 
incentives to focus on stock price.150 The profits that corporations earn will 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 1:1 (3d ed. 2016) (“Much of the industrial and commercial development of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries was made possible by the corporate mechanism.”); David McBride, General Corpora-
tion Laws: History and Economics, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 5 (“[N]o one could rea-
sonably question the success of the corporate form in promoting growth and economic innovation.”). 
 148 See generally James M. Poterba, Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and 
Healthcare: How and Why?, in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCA-
TION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 277 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996) (diag-
nosing the characteristics and differences in the government’s involvement in education and 
healthcare). 
 149 See generally Martin Gaynor & Robert J. Town, Competition in Health Care Markets, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 499 (Mark V. Pauly et al. eds., 2012) (analyzing the healthcare 
market structure and empirical evidence of healthcare outcomes); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is Health Care 
Special?, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Aug. 6, 2010), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/is-
health-care-special/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q777-HHH3] (discussing whether neo-classical theories 
of economics apply equally to the healthcare industry). 
 150 Many of the ways in which corporate executives and directors in the United States are com-
pensated, including the use of stock options and bonuses, are tied to corporate performance indicators 
such as stock price, which intensifies the corporate focus shareholder value. See, e.g., Dan Cable & 
Freek Vermeulen, Stop Paying Executives for Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 23, 2016), 
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reflect their costs, the volume of products or services that they can sell, and the 
prices they can charge for their products and services, both during periods of 
market exclusivity and beyond. In an efficient market, consumers have suffi-
cient information about the comparative benefits that a product or service will 
afford them. They can value those benefits and have the ability to choose from 
a range of competing alternatives that they can also value and compare. Fur-
thermore, they know what the price is, and they elect to purchase the good or 
service when the value it provides to them exceeds the cost. Competition 
among producers acts to reduce prices that diverge too much from underlying 
costs of production. In healthcare markets, however, most of these conditions 
are absent, allowing for markets where profits have been maximized at the ex-
pense of, rather than in pursuit of, public health value. 
We argue that this divergence of private and public value is due to three 
distinctive characteristics of healthcare markets that together lead to market 
failure when traditional corporations are left to select and produce healthcare 
products and services.151 These distinct characteristics are: (1) the failure of 
price to serve as a good indicator of public health value; (2) the public sharing 
of costs but not benefits; and (3) regulations and market structure that limit 
competition. Even though there may be other markets that have one or more of 
these characteristics, their combination and magnitude in healthcare markets 
creates and perpetuates a divergence of private sector incentives and public 
health needs. In the discussion below, we suggest that these three characteris-
tics of healthcare markets limit the responsiveness of companies to the health 
needs of individuals as well as public health and allow profit-driven decisions 
to distort product choice and pricing. 
1. Failure of Price to Reflect Public Health Value 
Although public health value lacks a single accepted definition and en-
compasses variables that are hard to quantify, most measures of public health 
value include two basic components: some measure of comparative therapeutic 
                                                                                                                           
https://hbr.org/2016/02/stop-paying-executives-for-performance [https://perma.cc/WV5A-BQVM] 
(documenting the adverse outcomes from incentivized executive and director compensation models); 
David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, CEO Pay at Valeant: Does Extreme Compensation Create Extreme 
Risk?, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Apr. 2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/
publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-56-ceo-pay-valeant-extreme-pay-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSR2-
JPGN] (discussing negative outcomes from performance-based compensation of executives based on 
increased stock prices). 
 151 Tax-exempt nonprofit organizations often are assumed to be the natural alternative to tradi-
tional for-profit organizations, particularly in markets that are underserved by private enterprises. In 
Part III, infra, we identify the limitations of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations—primarily, the lack 
of available investment capital—to explain why such organizations are not the solution to the prob-
lems created by for-profit organizations in healthcare markets. 
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benefit and some measure of cost effectiveness in meeting public health needs, 
which together indicate the quality of health outcomes per dollar.152 Although 
the debate over how best to measure public health value continues, there is 
little disagreement (at least among those not benefiting from the high prices) 
that whatever the measure of public health value, such value is not what is 
driving healthcare pricing. Healthcare pricing has received increased scrutiny 
from both the government and the public, especially in the wake of massive 
price increases for essential drugs, escalating prices for a range of healthcare 
services, and rising premiums for health insurance.153 Here we identify four 
interrelated factors contributing to the gulf between price and public health 
value. 
a. Lack of Pricing Transparency 
The first factor is the lack of transparency in healthcare pricing, including 
a lack of clear and accessible information both about what the price of a prod-
uct or service actually is and about what the quality and therapeutic value of 
that product or service is as compared to alternatives.154 The complexity and 
fragmentation of healthcare pricing and provision often leaves consumers with 
little or no information about the true price of the healthcare products and ser-
vices they receive or the cost of alternatives. In many cases, consumers receive 
little or no upfront information about what they will end up paying later. In 
addition, public and private payors alike lack effective mechanisms for as-
sessing the cost-effectiveness and therapeutic results of healthcare treatments 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Peter J. Neumann et al., Measuring the Value of Public Health Systems: The Disconnect 
Between Health Economists and Public Health Practitioners, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2173, 2176–77 
(2008) (defining and quantifying the public health benefit from government-led public health sys-
tems). 
 153 See, e.g., Hagop Kantarjian & Vivian Ho, The Harm of High Drug Prices, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 
12, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/policy-dose/articles/2016-12-12/the-harm-of-high-drug-
prices-to-americans-a-continuing-saga [https://perma.cc/7G68-76U9] (reporting on astronomical price 
increases to vital cancer drugs); Sydney Lupkin, 5 Reasons Prescription Drug Prices Are So High in 
the U.S., TIME (Aug. 23, 2016), http://time.com/money/4462919/prescription-drug-prices-too-high/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZR5Y-MGUA] (documenting five key findings from a Journal of the American 
Medical Association study analyzing the factors for rising drug prices in the United States). 
 154 See Leah Binder, Why Health-Care Price Transparency Isn’t Enough for Consumers, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/03/26/why-health-care-price-transparency-
isnt-enough-for-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/3NWZ-HRPG] (discussing why Americans want greater 
insight into healthcare costs and why transparency does not mean greater outcomes); see also Robert 
Pearl, America’s Broken Health Care System: The Role of Drug, Device Manufacturers, FORBES 
(Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2014/04/24/americas-broken-health-care-
system-the-role-of-drug-device-manufacturers/ [https://perma.cc/F9VU-WG82] (describing how pa-
tients tend to opt for expensive new therapies despite the absence of proven clinical benefits over 
traditional alternatives, for example in the case of prostate surgery). 
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as well as mechanisms for tying such cost-benefit assessments to price.155 In-
creasing efforts are being made by some healthcare payors to insert some 
measure of healthcare value into pricing, including recent moves to transition 
from fee-for-service to value-based reimbursement and to use reference pricing 
to cap payments for standardized products and services.156 Yet, the pricing of 
healthcare products and services remains highly non-transparent. Healthcare 
consumers must make decisions about their healthcare without a clear idea 
(sometimes without any idea) of the cost of their proposed treatment or the 
availability and cost of alternative treatments.157 In some cases, consumers are 
also uncertain of the expected health value of the product or service.158 Produc-
ers and intermediaries can take advantage of price and product information 
opacity to keep their prices high even in situations where the health value to 
consumers is low. 
b. Disconnect Between Purchasing Power and Consumer Value 
A second and closely related factor lies in the disconnect among (1) the 
person or entity making many of the healthcare purchasing decisions; (2) the 
                                                                                                                           
 155 See Ifrad Islam, Rising Cost of Drugs: Where Do We Go from Here?, HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 31, 
2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150831.050265/full/ [https://perma.cc/
M974-ZQDS] (recommending three measures for improving drug pricing: participative pricing, joint 
accountability for outcomes, and increased regulation of generics); see also Press Release, World 
Health Org., New WHO Report Shows That Transparency and Cooperation Help to Reduce High 
Prices for New Medicines (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/press-
releases/2015/03/new-who-report-shows-that-transparency-and-cooperation-help-to-reduce-high-
prices-for-new-medicines [https://perma.cc/8MZF-WWZF]) (emphasizing need for and importance of 
mechanisms for ensuring that prices for new drugs reflect therapeutic results). 
 156 See Ann Boynton & James C. Robinson, Appropriate Use of Reference Pricing Can Increase 
Value, HEALTH AFF. (July 7, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/07/appropriate-use-of-
reference-pricing-can-increase-value/ [https://perma.cc/3JJW-GD8G] (reporting on reference pricing 
and consumer access to healthcare); Bruce Merlin Fried & Jeremy David Sherer, Value-Based Reim-
bursement: The Rock Thrown into the Health Care Pond, HEALTH AFF. (July 8, 2016), http://health
affairs.org/blog/2016/07/08/value-based-reimbursement-the-rock-thrown-into-the-health-care-pond/ 
[https://perma.cc/PM39-WUBE] (analyzing the benefits to healthcare costs based on value instead of 
the traditional fee for service structure which leads to excessive and unnecessary spending). 
 157 See, e.g., Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, Health Care Price Transparency: Can It Promote 
High Value Care?, COMM. FUND, https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-
article/health-care-price-transparency-can-it-promote-high-value-care [https://perma.cc/27TC-XGYJ] 
(“It’s no secret that the U.S. health care market is unlike any other market: patients rarely know what 
they’ll pay for services until they’ve received them; health care providers bill different payers differ-
ent prices for the same services; and privately insured patients pay more to subsidize the shortfalls left 
by uninsured patients.”). 
 158 See, e.g., D. ANDREW AUSTIN & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: DOES 
PRICE TRANSPARENCY IMPROVE MARKET EFFICIENCY? IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN 
OTHER MARKETS FOR THE HEALTH SECTOR (2008) (reporting on the complexity of pricing in 
healthcare, including limitations on patient information). 
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person or entity paying for those decisions; and (3) the end user.159 Whereas 
prices bear a clear relationship to consumer value and purchasing power in com-
petitive markets, “the forces of competition do not work well in [healthcare mar-
kets] where the consumer who pays does not choose and the physician who 
chooses does not pay.”160 Further, in many cases, given the role of private in-
surance and government provided benefits, the consumer is also unlikely to be 
the one paying directly for healthcare, which distances consumer value and 
purchasing power even more.161 There are a number of intermediaries involved 
in the process of providing healthcare products and services, and these inter-
mediaries often determine what products and services are available, when they 
should be provided, at what price, and to whom. These intermediaries make 
these determinations through a highly opaque process that leaves the consumer 
with little or no information about relative costs and value apart from advice 
received from physicians who are neither consumers nor payors. The interme-
diaries are compensated in ways that are not directly tied to the health benefits 
of their decisions, but rather are dependent on price arbitrage and profit-
sharing relationships among industry stakeholders, further widening the gap 
between consumer health value and purchasing decisions. 
Take for example the prescription and provision of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. Physicians, who are responsible for selecting and prescribing drugs to 
their patients, are not compensated for time spent learning about costs or help-
ing patients manage costs, nor are they rewarded for finding cheaper ways of 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See, e.g., Stuart Guterman, Making Markets Work in Health Care: What Does That Mean?, 
HEALTH AFF. (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/06/03/making-markets-work-in-
health-care-what-does-that-mean/ [https://perma.cc/A8W2-KLMS] (noting, for example, that only 
11.7 % of national health expenditures were paid directly by consumers in 2012); see also Abbott 
Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., No. 05 C 1490, 2005 WL 1323435, at *15 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2005), 
vacated, 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing how benefits organizations create drug formular-
ies to provide which drugs are covered under the plan, and further discussing how some organizations, 
including Medicaid, will not cover any cost if the drug is not a “preferred drug” found on the “formu-
lary”); Gordon D. Schiff et al., A Prescription for Improving Drug Formulary Decision Making, 
PLOS MED., May 2012, at 1, https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.
pmed.1001220&type=printable [https://perma.cc/G8A4-XHUQ] (describing how some clinicians 
consider drug formularies as a limit to clinical autonomy and as a clinical hurdle for both patients and 
physicians). 
 160 Engelberg, supra note 10. 
 161 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and 
the New Medical Marketplace,106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008) (explaining how healthcare markets 
work differently than other markets because of the role of insurers and other intermediaries); see also 
How Price Transparency Can Control the Cost of Healthcare, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2016/03/how-price-transparency-controls-
health-care-cost.html [https://perma.cc/7Q46-YR4C] (finding that healthcare consumers would alter 
their consumption of healthcare services with greater price transparency); AUSTIN & GRAVELLE, 
supra note 158 (discussing special characteristics of healthcare markets that may reduce importance of 
prices as signals, including presence of third-party payment systems). 
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achieving the same health benefit.162 Further, although direct kickbacks are 
illegal, physicians often have business relationships with pharmaceutical com-
panies that influence the information they have about alternative products, 
their views about the comparative benefits of such products, and their deci-
sions to prescribe them.163 
Wholesalers, pharmacies, and pharmacy benefit managers also play an 
important role in the distribution chains for drugs and other medical prod-
ucts.164 Even though pharmacy benefit managers actually do use comparative 
effectiveness data in their decision-making, they do so largely to extract re-
bates from drug manufacturers rather than to rationalize prices for end users.165 
Indeed, pharmacy benefit managers have recently come under attack for the 
opacity of their pricing decisions, the rebates they command and retain, and 
the divergence that is created between prices received by drug manufacturers 
and prices charged to end users or insurers.166 
Although consumers are the end users of the drugs, many do not pay di-
rectly for the drugs they use. The main purchasers of healthcare products and 
services are private insurance plans, HMOs, and federal and state governments 
––whether through Medicare, Medicaid, Department of Veterans Affairs, De-
partment of Defense, or state and federal programs for government employ-
ees.167 But, federal and state governments have limited information about 
public health value and are also restricted in their ability to bargain for prices 
and make decisions to forego treatments based on price.168 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See, e.g., Doctors and Rx Prices: Ending the Silence, CONSUMER REP. (June 21, 2016), http://
www.consumerreports.org/drugs/doctors-and-rx-prices-ending-the-silence/ [https://perma.cc/V8G2-
KLV9] (reporting on the disconnect between physicians prescribing medication and a patient’s aware-
ness of cost). 
 163 See Charles Ornstein et al., Now There’s Proof: Docs Who Get Company Cash Tend to Pre-
scribe More Brand-Name Meds, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/
doctors-who-take-company-cash-tend-to-prescribe-more-brand-name-drugs [https://perma.cc/8QNW-
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 164 See, e.g., THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOLLOW THE PILL: UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. COM-
MERCIAL PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 1–2 (2005) (documenting the lifecycle of pharmaceutical 
drugs and the important players involved). 
 165 Joseph Walker, Drugmakers Point Finger at Middlemen for Rising Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., 
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/drugmakers-point-finger-at-middlemen-for-rising-drug-
prices-1475443336 [https://perma.cc/A282-CB8F].  
 166 See, e.g., id. (tracing the effect of pharmacy benefit managers on increased drug prices). 
 167 See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDI-
TURES 2016 HIGHLIGHTS, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/PRC9-
7LNS]. 
 168 See Islam, supra note 155 (noting the government’s inability to regulate the pricing of phar-
maceutical drugs); see also Ed Silverman, Should Medicare Negotiate Part D Drug Prices?, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/02/03/should-medicare-negotiate-part-d-
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Even when end-users are directly involved in paying for drugs, they typi-
cally lack adequate information about the health benefits they are getting and 
the choices that they have when making their purchasing decisions.169 Indeed, 
end-users are often not even sure of what price they will ultimately pay for 
their healthcare product or service.170 Overall, the fragmentation of the process 
for purchasing healthcare and the range of intermediaries who exercise control 
over the process leads to pricing that is not commensurate with or responsive 
to patient or public health value. 
c. Inelastic (and Sometimes Irrational) Demand 
Even when end users do have some role in their purchasing decisions, 
many healthcare purchasing decisions are made in situations of duress where 
the end users perceive a lack of choice in their decision. Often, healthcare 
products and services are perceived by end users as the difference between life 
and death or between quality of life and suffering. In other cases, decisions are 
made under emergency conditions.171 Purchasing decisions made under a state 
of physical and emotional duress or in a state of emergency may not be consid-
ered as either informed or rational. A lack of transparency about alternative 
choices and true costs in healthcare markets exacerbates this problem. Even 
where the decisions are made by third parties who are not subject to such du-
ress, demand for expensive life-saving drugs remains fairly inelastic.172 The 
                                                                                                                           
drug-prices-take-our-reader-poll/ [https://perma.cc/JC24-ZAM4] (polling readers on whether they 
believe the government should take part in regulating drug pricing). 
 169 See generally ETHICS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Michael A. Santoro & Thomas 
M. Gorrie eds., 2005) (exploring policy proposals for addressing the ethical dilemmas of drug industry 
behavior). 
 170 According to Marc-André Gagnon, the end-user dilemma can be described by the following 
analogy: 
Pharmaceutical markets can be compared to a dinner for three: the first person (the phy-
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pensive. 
Gagnon, supra note 9, at 573. 
 171 See Pearl, supra note 154 (“Outside of health care, people can choose whether to pay inflated 
prices for a patent-protected technology or minimally better products. But patients don’t have that 
same choice—at least not without facing potentially serious health consequences.”). 
 172 Islam, supra note 155, at 5; see also Marcelle Arak & Sheila Tschinkel, Why the ‘Free Mar-
ket’ for Drugs Doesn’t Work and What We Can Do About It, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://theconversation.com/why-the-free-market-for-drugs-doesnt-work-and-what-we-can-do-about-it-
70007 [https://perma.cc/H426-3DD7] (“Drug companies . . . can get away with raising prices without 
losing customers because the demand for certain medications is insensitive to their cost. If a drug will 
save your life, you’ll probably pay whatever the cost, if you can.”). 
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essential and often time-sensitive nature of many healthcare products and ser-
vices creates inelasticities in the market that companies can exploit at the ex-
pense of consumers and/or government payors. For Medicare and commercial 
health plans and for individuals paying out of pocket, there are few, if any, 
rules dictating the price that a company can charge or the ability of a company 
to raise prices, even in emergency settings.173 Where a product has a substan-
tial impact on health and there are no alternatives and no competition, demand 
is inelastic, and companies have the ability to raise their prices to what the 
market will bear, raising prices is exactly what profit-maximizing companies 
do. 
Furthermore, even in situations where there is no threat of imminent harm 
and no life or death choice at stake, people often have difficulty making ration-
al, informed decisions about healthcare choices. Healthcare choices are often 
complex, and the information needed to make informed decisions is either un-
available or too difficult for a non-expert to understand. Patients are treated 
like consumers and asked to make healthcare choices without a clear under-
standing of what they are choosing between and what the likely health value of 
their choice will be. Concern about their health, which is often exacerbated by 
consumer advertising of healthcare products, can encourage consumers to pay 
high prices for products without having a rational basis for doing so. 
d. Underpricing of Certain Healthcare Products and Services 
A fourth factor causing divergence of price and public health value is the 
failure of price to reflect both positive and negative externalities associated 
with some types of healthcare products and services, such as antibiotics, opi-
oids, and vaccines.174 There may be important externalities associated with 
particular healthcare choices that are not captured in the prices, or profitability, 
of healthcare products and services. The externality could be negative, such as 
the impact on populations when antibiotics are overused and concerns of anti-
biotic resistance grow or when opioids are over-used with severe public health 
consequences. Alternatively, the externalities could be positive, such as the 
benefits to the population when individuals receive vaccinations. Prices do not 
reflect these external effects. In some cases, for example, prices may end up 
being too low, driving healthcare companies to forego efforts to develop prod-
                                                                                                                           
 173 See generally Rachel Sachs, Delinking Reimbursements, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307 (2018) (ana-
lyzing the power of pharmaceutical companies to protect their products and set arbitrary drug prices). 
 174 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying 
New Financial Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1689, 1693 (2010) (criti-
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ucts and services that would yield significant public health value simply be-
cause the risk-adjusted profits they anticipate are not high enough.175 In the 
case of antibiotics, healthcare companies’ incentives to increase sales through 
lower prices are in direct conflict with public health needs to curtail antibiotic 
sales and use.176 
In summary, the four factors enumerated here each contribute to a poor 
correlation between the price charged by healthcare companies for their prod-
ucts and services and the actual public health value that individuals and the 
public gain from such products and services. As a result, companies focusing 
on maximizing revenues may not be—indeed, are unlikely to be—maximizing 
shareholder value and public health outcomes simultaneously. 
2. Public Sharing of Costs but Not Benefits 
A 2016 study found that tax-funded expenditures accounted for 64.3% of 
U.S. healthcare expenditures in 2013, with an expected rise to 67.1% by 
2024.177 These expenditures primarily take the form of (1) direct government 
payments for Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Health Administration, the Na-
tional Institute of Health, public health departments, and other government 
funded programs; (2) public employees’ health insurance; and (3) tax subsidies 
for healthcare at the local, state, and federal level.178 The state thus plays a 
huge role in financing both the production and the consumption of healthcare 
products and services.  
Starting first with public investments in production, government support 
is justified on the ground that there will be an underproduction in the 
knowledge needed to produce healthcare goods. Private markets are designed 
to provide private goods, which are goods characterized by rivalry and exclud-
                                                                                                                           
 175 See supra notes 31–66 and accompanying text (discussing the profit maximization focus for 
drug companies and its impact on healthcare outcomes). 
 176 Kevin Outterson et al., Delinking Investment in Antibiotic Research and Development from 
Sales Revenues: The Challenges of Transforming a Promising Idea into Reality, PLOS MED., June 
2016, at 2, https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002043&
type=printable [https://perma.cc/QFZ2-TVZ4]; Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: 
The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 616, 624 
(2009) (discussing the dire health consequences from overuse of antibiotics); see also Maryn McKen-
na, The Case for Expensive Antibiotics, WIRED (Sept. 19 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/
antibiotics-pharma-price-jump-is-testing-one-of-medicines-oldest-questions/ [https://perma.cc/ZEX8-
6DET] (discussing why the low price of antibiotics, as compared to other treatments, might some-
times be a problem). 
 177 David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Current and Projected Taxpayer Shares of 
US Health Costs, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 449, 450 (2016). 
 178 Id. at 449. 
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ability.179 They are not designed to provide public goods, which are goods 
characterized by non-rivalry—i.e., consumption by one does not reduce the 
availability of the good for consumption by another—and non-excludability—
i.e., once they are made available to one, others cannot be effectively excluded 
from using that good.180 Relying on private markets to produce public goods 
results in underproduction and overpricing of public goods or even in no pro-
duction at all. This type of market failure justifies government intervention to 
pay for and even sometimes to produce or at least regulate the price and distri-
bution of these goods. The absence of such public support and intervention 
will result in social welfare loss. Although healthcare is sometimes referred to 
in popular literature as a public good, most healthcare products and services 
are not public goods in a strict economic sense. But, the research and devel-
opment that underlies the discovery and development of many healthcare 
products and services, particularly medical technologies and therapies, is re-
garded as a public good and financed heavily by the government through ad-
ministrative agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the National 
Science Foundation. 
Public investment in healthcare R&D in the United States reflects an un-
derstanding that the R&D that leads to healthcare goods is a quasi-public good 
that will be under-produced under normal market conditions without govern-
ment intervention.181 Hence, in the United States, the government attempts to 
offset such an outcome via direct financial subsidies and regulatory protections 
for healthcare innovators, such as by instituting patents and tax breaks.182 
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Downstream applications of this publicly funded R&D, including profit-
making from this R&D, are left to the private market. As a result, the alloca-
tion of the risks and benefits of publicly financed R&D is becoming increas-
ingly tilted toward benefitting private companies, with the public bearing the 
risk and paying high costs for the results and the private companies earning 
high profits.183 The tensions between public and private interests have grown 
over time as federal and state government funders have increasingly prioritized 
the commercialization of biomedical research without adequate attention to the 
asymmetric distribution of the resulting benefits of the research, thereby so-
cializing the costs of healthcare production but not the benefits.184 
Public investment in the production of healthcare products and services is 
not limited to financial support for R&D. In addition to their role as payors for 
healthcare products and services through programs such as Medicare and Med-
icaid, as discussed below, federal, state, and local governments offer financial 
support for all kinds of healthcare costs, both directly through grants and other 
subsidies and indirectly through vehicles such as tax deductions and granting 
tax-exempt status. Taxpayer funds have helped to finance the adoption of elec-
tronic healthcare records,185 subsidize many aspects of hospital services be-
yond the tax-exempt status that non-profit hospitals can claim,186 allow em-
ployers to deduct employee healthcare costs as business expenses,187 fund 
training programs for physicians,188 and be useful in all kinds of other ways to 
subsidize the costs of producing healthcare products and services. 
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In addition to sharing the costs and risks of production, the state (includ-
ing local, state, and federal governments) plays an important role in the pur-
chase of healthcare products and services through public health insurance pro-
grams such as Medicare and Medicaid. Although it plays important roles as 
purchaser of healthcare, there are both legal and political limitations on the 
ability of the government to negotiate prices. Private companies thus benefit 
from government support both at the production and consumption stages. 
3. Regulation and Market Structure That Limit Competition 
Healthcare markets have many features that distinguish them from the 
economic benchmark of a perfectly competitive market.189 A combination of 
concentrated market structure and company-friendly regulation have limited 
competition in many parts of the healthcare marketplace, with subsequent ef-
fects on price and quality of healthcare. 
Starting first with market structure: the structure of healthcare markets 
has become increasingly concentrated as a result of consolidation of hospital 
chains, healthcare provider groups, healthcare payers, and drug developers.190 
An increasingly concentrated group of healthcare providers and private insur-
ers use their market power in the purchasing and provision of healthcare to 
influence the price, quality, and nature of healthcare products and services, 
thereby making choices that favor profits over public health value.191 Where 
competition in the healthcare system does occur, some commentators suggest 
that it “occurs at the wrong level, over the wrong things, in the wrong geo-
graphic markets, and at the wrong time.”192 The lack of competition and ine-
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lastic demand, in turn, allow for a large and continued divergence between cost 
of production and price. The CEO of Mylan, for example, when called out for 
the more than 400% price hike in EpiPens,193 suggested that it was not her 
company, but the healthcare system, that was at fault—her job was simply to 
see what prices the market would accept.194 Pricing is based not on cost or on 
health value, but rather on what the market will bear.195 
Regulation also plays an important role in limiting competition. 
Healthcare markets are characterized by regulations that frequently confer sig-
nificant market power on incumbents.196 The reward for making the significant 
investment necessary to enter healthcare markets is a shelter from competition 
created through patents and data and market exclusivities. Often such regulato-
ry protections from competition are cumulative and long-lasting. As a result, 
healthcare companies are able to control prices and/or production over long 
periods of time without the discipline that market pressures impose.197 In other 
words, competition will exert discipline on the production and pricing deci-
sions of corporations in a competitive market, forcing corporations to compete 
on product choice, pricing, and product quality. Where corporations are shel-
tered from competition, they can increase prices, reduce output, and shirk on 
product quality.198 
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Further, incentive structures created by regulation often distort the relative 
attractiveness of different projects in ways that do not reflect public health 
need. Regulations designed to encourage the development of therapies for or-
phan diseases through market exclusivities and tax incentives, for example, 
have led many large drug companies to refocus their efforts away from diseas-
es with large public health burdens and towards niche markets that promise 
lower financial risk and high potential returns.199 
The three characteristic of healthcare markets that have been identified 
above: (1) the failure of price to reflect public health value, (2) the public shar-
ing of costs but not benefits, and (3) regulations and market structure that limit 
competition, combine to create a persistent and even growing divergence be-
tween private incentives and public health needs. Even in competitive market 
settings, maximizing profits using prices that do not correlate well with public 
health value will result in inefficient production. But, this divergence of private 
incentives and public health need is compounded by the other two characteris-
tics of the healthcare market. By treating publicly subsidized healthcare goods 
and services as private goods and leaving them to the market to produce, 
where private corporations sheltered from competition and benefiting from 
limited demand elasticity and a lack of price transparency make production 
and pricing choices to maximize profits instead of public health value, we get 
sub-optimal healthcare outcomes at a very high cost. Traditional corporations 
operating in healthcare markets with these characteristics have too much pow-
er over price and product choice since they operate in markets with distorted 
and often relatively inelastic (desperate) demand. Furthermore, they neglect 
the public goods aspects of both inputs in the R&D process and the products 
and services they produce, and they exploit regulations that limit entry and 
competition. 
The importance of this from a policy perspective is that corporations op-
erating in healthcare markets fail to take public health interests into account 
when making product and service pricing and production choices on purpose. 
Healthcare companies are limited in their ability to take the public interest un-
der account because, as discussed earlier, they are focused on maximizing their 
value for their shareholders.200 Where maximizing shareholder value involves 
actions that diverge from measures designed to maximize public health benefit, 
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corporations are expected to and indeed take the actions they are permitted or 
even encouraged to take under the law.201 It is this focus on profits in a market 
where profits do not reflect consumer value, and indeed sometime come at the 
expense of consumer health, that leads to poor health outcomes. 
B. Why Targeting Company Structure Makes Sense 
The considerations discussed above suggest that relying on profit-
maximizing corporations operating within current market structures to provide 
healthcare products and services will lead to poor public health outcomes. As 
discussed in Part I, the recognition that the healthcare market is broken and in 
need of reform is not new and has been widely discussed. Yet most, if not all, 
policy responses have focused on interventions designed to change the market 
rather than the market actors themselves. We argue that changing market actors 
directly provides a sound mechanism for improving the operation of healthcare 
markets. We suggest that changing the corporate form can be used to change 
the incentives of corporate actors from the inside, forcing them to internalize 
and respond to public health needs while realizing profits. Part III identifies the 
benefits of targeting the corporate form as a core part of current healthcare 
market reforms and begins to explore how such an approach might be imple-
mented. Given the novelty of hybrid entities and the legal frameworks that 
govern then, our discussion in this Article is confined largely to how such hy-
brid entities could perform in the presence of robust regulatory structures to 
enforce their core principles.202 
III. A NEW APPROACH: HYBRIDS FOR HEALTHCARE MARKETS 
Until recently, there has been a largely binary approach towards company 
structure in the United States that forces a separation between the pursuit of 
profits and the pursuit of social objectives. This approach toward company 
structure is manifested in the choice between a “for-profit” business form, fo-
cused largely on maximizing shareholder value, and a “non-profit” organiza-
tional form, focused on the pursuit of one or more charitable purposes. The 
traditional “for-profit” or business corporation can be organized for any legal 
business purpose, has private owners, can raise private capital, and can distrib-
ute profits to its investors. Its profits are taxed and it is not entitled to receive 
tax-deductible funds or grants. In contrast, the “non-profit” organization is 
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generally required to have a charitable, educational, scientific, or other non-
commercial purpose, does not have shareholders, and cannot raise private capi-
tal or distribute profits. It is subject to oversight by governmental authorities 
only (or almost-exclusively) and to certain restrictions on its operations, but in 
return, it can raise tax-deductible funds and its activities are tax-exempt. This 
binary approach toward corporate structure exacerbates the conflict between 
the desire to pursue the public interest and the desire to generate profits, which 
has led to inefficiencies where there are opportunities to “do well by doing 
good.”203 
New hybrid legal forms offer the possibility of accomplishing both social 
good and private wealth creation within the same entity. We argue that encour-
aging (or requiring) healthcare companies to operate under new hybrid legal 
forms that mandate consideration of stakeholder (not just shareholder) interests 
will narrow the divergence between private incentives and public health needs 
in ways that benefit public health, provided that there is robust regulatory en-
forcement of the hybrid rules. After a brief discussion of hybrid corporate 
forms in the United States, we show how the core features of hybrid forms of-
fer advantages over alternative, current organizational forms in the production 
of healthcare products and services. 
A. Alternative Corporate Forms: Choices and Implications 
1. Evolution of the Corporate Form and Shareholder Primacy 
Great corporations exist only because they are created and safe-
guarded by our institutions; and it is therefore our right and our du-
ty to see that they work in harmony with those institutions. 
—Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress, 1901204 
In a free-enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive 
is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct respon-
sibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the busi-
ness in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to 
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied 
in ethical custom. 
—Milton Friedman, 1970205 
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The corporate form in the United States dates back to the 1790s, when the 
United States “began to lead the world in the development of the corporation 
as the most dynamic form of modern business enterprise.”206 The creation of a 
business entity with limited liability and a perpetual lifespan provided a good 
vehicle for securing investors and pooling resources, which resulted in robust 
economic growth. Although many early corporations were small and their op-
erations and governance tailored to the needs of a range of stakeholders, by the 
1930s some corporations had become much larger and a formalized separation 
of ownership and control began to take place. 
Modern corporations are controlled by their directors and managers, who 
are legally required to act as fiduciaries in accordance with the interests of 
their shareholders and other stakeholders. One of the biggest debates in corpo-
rate law is whether and to what extent (if at all) the interests of non-
shareholder stakeholders should be considered for purposes of corporate deci-
sions.207 Yet, even as this debate continues to occupy corporate theorists, it is 
largely resolved in favor of shareholders under the corporate laws of virtually 
all fifty states.208 In practice, if not in theory, for-profit corporations are de-
signed to benefit shareholders, not to pursue the interests of other stakeholders. 
This approach is clearly reflected in the corporate laws of Delaware, the lead-
ing state for corporate jurisprudence.209 
The notion that the duty of managers and directors is primarily to maxim-
ize shareholder value is famously captured in Milton Friedman’s depiction of 
the social responsibility of a corporation to increase its profits. According to 
Friedman, managers have a fiduciary duty to act with the same care and dili-
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gence in corporate matters as they would in their own affairs,210 which is gen-
erally understood as “[to] conduct business activities with a view to enhancing 
corporate profit and shareholder gain.”211 Although managers and directors are 
protected in their reasonable exercise of “business judgment,” their decisions 
must ultimately be justifiable as efforts consistent with the protection of share-
holder value.212 The interests of non-shareholder constituencies on the other 
hand, such as those of employees, creditors, and suppliers, are protected large-
ly through contracts rather than fiduciary duties, and the interests of the gen-
eral public receive no formal protection. 
These views have been both captured and delineated in the seminal case 
of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-
distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to 
other purposes.213 
The primacy of shareholder value embodied in this decision has since been 
widely accepted by courts,214 and shareholder wealth maximization has come 
to dominate corporate governance as the fundamental norm that guides all cor-
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 212 See DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, 1 CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 6.02 
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Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156–57 (1932) (expressing an 
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Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 826 (2012). 
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porate decision-makers.215 Although for-profit corporations can and sometimes 
do engage in altruistic behavior, the law is clear that their overriding legal pur-
pose must be to benefit shareholders, not third-party stakeholders.216 Accord-
ingly, the directors, officers, and managers of for-profit corporations have a 
fiduciary duty to make decisions that are in the best financial interests of 
shareholders notwithstanding competing considerations, and corporate officers 
who do not meet that duty are subject to liability in both their corporate and 
personal capacities.217 
In routine or day-to-day contexts, the “business judgment rule” protects 
directors who make decisions based on non-shareholder interests so long as 
they are rationally related to the long-term promotion of shareholder value.218 
A corporate action that clearly and admittedly harms shareholder value or 
seeks to achieve non-shareholder benefits is likely to be found by courts to 
constitute a breach of a director’s fiduciary duties. In contrast, directors who 
choose shareholder primacy over competing non-shareholder considerations, 
or even ignore these considerations, compelling as they might be, do not face 
any such liability. There is no cause of action against directors for making too 
much money for shareholders. In fact, many would agree that over the past few 
decades, there has been a continued shift in corporate law away from a broad 
view of stakeholder interests and towards an almost exclusive focus on share-
holder value.219 This trend has been further exacerbated by the increasing 
prevalence of executive compensation packages that provide hefty rewards for 
managers and directors who produce growth in shareholder value.220 
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Perhaps in response to this corporate focus on shareholder value at the 
expense of broader public interests, a number of states, beginning with Penn-
sylvania in 1983, started adopting statutes that permit directors to take the in-
terests of a variety of constituencies other than shareholders into account in 
their decision-making.221 In practice, however, these constituency provisions 
have been seldom used, and where they are used, they often require that the 
interests of any non-shareholder constituency bear a relationship to the best 
interests of the corporation, viewed in terms of shareholder value.222 As ex-
plained by Chancellor Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court: 
Precisely because it is ultimately the equity market that is the primary 
accountability system for public firms, efforts to tinker around with 
the margins of corporate law through initiatives like constituency 
statutes, the so-called Corporate Social Responsibility movement, and 
antitakeover provisions have been of very little utility in insulating 
corporate boards from stockholder and stock market pressures.223 
As a result, even with constituency provisions in place, when a corporate deci-
sion hangs in the balance, a decision that is made to benefit the financial inter-
ests of shareholders carries the least risk of fiduciary liability and most often 
the largest financial compensation for the decision-maker. 
2. Emergence of Benefit and Social Purpose Corporations 
It is against this background, with the increasingly stark choice between a 
for-profit focus on shareholder value and a not-for-profit focus on charitable 
goals, that states have begun enacting statutes authorizing so-called “hybrid” 
for-profit business entities. Within the past decade, thirty-seven states and the 
District of Columbia have adopted laws authorizing distinct types of legal enti-
ties—generally, special forms of corporations and limited liability compa-
nies—that cater to business owners who desire to pursue profit-making as well 
as a social or environmental mission.224 This trend can be seen in a number of 
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other jurisdictions around the world where similar laws authorizing hybrid 
business entities have been adopted.225 
The two main hybrid corporate forms instituted in the United States to 
date are the benefit corporation and the “social purpose corporation.”226 These 
new types of corporations attempt to balance the competing and sometimes 
conflicting interests that arise when a business seeks to be both for-profit and 
mission-driven within a single entity. Just like regular corporations, these hy-
brid forms have private owners, can raise private capital, and can distribute 
profits to their investors. They are treated like regular for-profit businesses for 
federal, state, and local tax purposes, receiving no special income tax benefits 
or incentives.227 Yet, these entities are similar to nonprofit corporations in their 
required pursuit of a social good. The achievement of social objectives—such 
as improving public health outcomes—is made a part of the objectives of the 
business along with generating revenue and profits. 
Both benefit corporations and social purpose corporations are variants of 
states’ regular business corporation statutes. Of the thirty-eight jurisdictions in 
the United States that have enacted some type of hybrid corporate form, thirty-
four have authorized the establishment of benefit corporations with Maryland 
being the first state to pass benefit corporation legislation in 2010.228 Since 
then, thirty-three more states (including Delaware) and the District of Colum-
bia have followed with their own variants.229 
Just like a corporation, benefit corporations are managed by a board of di-
rectors, and their day-to-day affairs are carried out by officers and employees. 
Stockholders invest capital into the benefit corporation in exchange for shares, 
and the stockholders determine the members of the board of directors and re-
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 228 See infra Appendix A. 
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tain voting privileges over certain major decisions.230 But, unlike regular busi-
ness corporations, which primarily pursue profits for the benefit of sharehold-
ers, a benefit corporation must (1) pursue a “general public benefit” (and may 
adopt a “specific public benefit” as well); (2) consider non-financial interests 
of its shareholders and other stakeholders when making decisions; and (3) is-
sue reports on how well it is achieving its overall social and environmental 
objectives.231 In addition, unlike corporations that have adopted constituency 
statute language in their articles of incorporation, benefit corporations are re-
quired, rather than merely permitted, to pursue a general public benefit. 
Indeed, the legal mandate and requirement to produce a “general public 
benefit” is the hallmark of the benefit corporation. In most states that have en-
acted benefit corporation legislation, the definition of a “general public bene-
fit” is a “material positive impact on society and the environment.”232 The mo-
tivating idea behind this language is to create for-profit corporations that will 
generate revenue and earn profits, but that will do so in a manner benefitting 
society and the environment as well as shareholders. In so doing, the general 
public benefit requirement turns benefit corporations into so-called “triple bot-
tom line companies,” focusing their efforts on profits, people, and planet. In 
that regard, benefit corporations are different both from social purpose corpo-
rations (discussed below) that pursue either a social or environmental purpose 
primarily, and regular corporations subject to constituency statutes that may 
consider other purposes but are still primarily governed by the profit-making 
imperative.233 
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Social purpose corporations are an alternative hybrid form that has been 
adopted, to date, by four states234 in response to the concern that directors and 
officers of benefit corporations are required to consider the interests of too 
many stakeholders in addition to shareholders. Rather than pursue a general 
public benefit, a social purpose corporation need only pursue and attempt to 
accomplish the specific social or environmental purpose or purposes articulat-
ed in its articles of incorporation.235 Moreover, with the exception of Califor-
nia, the directors of a social purpose corporation are not required to consider 
the corporation’s social or environmental purpose(s) unless explicitly required 
to do so by the corporation’s articles of incorporation. In this regard, outside of 
California, the social purpose corporation is similar to a regular corporation 
that has adopted constituency language in its articles of incorporation. 
3. Unique Desirable Features of Hybrids 
Both the benefit corporation and the social purpose corporation have spe-
cial corporate governance features that distinguish them from traditional cor-
porations in ways that make them better vehicles for responding to healthcare 
needs. We identify four such features: (1) required consideration of non-
pecuniary purposes in decision-making, including general and specific public 
benefits and a broad set of stakeholder interests; (2) protection of directors 
from liability for considering non-pecuniary purposes; (3) reporting require-
ments assessed against third-party reporting standards; and (4) enforcement 
mechanisms. Understanding these special corporate governance features is 
important for appreciating the potential that benefit corporations and social 
purpose corporations have for improving healthcare outcomes. 
a. Consideration of Non-Pecuniary Purposes and Stakeholder Interests 
Benefit corporation directors are not only permitted but are required to 
consider the impact of any proposed corporate action on a broad range of 
stakeholders as well as general and specific public interests. These stakehold-
ers and public interests include: (1) the interests of the corporation’s share-
holders; (2) the interests of its employees and workforce; (3) the interests of its 
subsidiaries and suppliers; (4) the interests of its customers to the extent they 
are beneficiaries of the general or specific public benefit purposes of the bene-
fit corporation; (5) the impact on its surrounding community and society at 
large; (6) the impact on the local and global environment; (7) the long-term 
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and short-term interests of the benefit corporation, including whether the bene-
fit corporation should remain “independent”; and (8) the ability of the benefit 
corporation to accomplish its general and specific benefit purposes.236 In addi-
tion, a director of a benefit corporation may consider any other pertinent fac-
tors or the interests of any other group that the director determines to be ap-
propriate.237 In performing their fiduciary duties, directors of benefit corpora-
tions are not required to give priority to the interests of any particular person or 
group unless the benefit corporation has stated its intention of doing so in its 
articles of incorporation.238 Officers of benefit corporations are likewise re-
quired to weigh a variety of such considerations in addition to and beyond the 
bottom line.239 Further, in addition to the generic declaration in their incorpora-
tion documents, benefit corporations can (in most states) or even must (e.g., in 
Delaware) expressly include one or more specific public benefit goals. Some 
states even require benefit corporations, particularly those that are publicly 
traded, to have a “benefit director” on their board whose responsibility it is to 
ensure that the benefit corporation is meeting its stated public purpose.240 
For social purpose corporations, the non-pecuniary purpose (e.g., improv-
ing healthcare outcomes in the United States) must likewise be stated in the cor-
poration’s incorporation documents. The incorporation documents must also ex-
plicitly state that the corporation’s directors are required to pursue the non-
pecuniary purpose.241 In addition to the normal duties of care and loyalty to 
shareholders, a director of a social purpose corporation may consider factors the 
director deems relevant to discharging his or her duties, including: (1) the short-
term and long-term prospects of the social purpose corporation; (2) the best in-
terests of the social purpose corporation and its shareholders; and (3) the purpos-
es of the social purpose corporation as set forth in its articles of incorporation.242 
b. Limiting Liability of Directors for Implementing Benefit Purpose 
Directors and officers of benefit corporations enjoy certain protections 
from fiduciary liability that are not available to directors of regular corpora-
tions. Most importantly, benefit corporation directors and officers may not be 
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held monetarily liable by shareholders or by the corporation for pursuing or 
failing to pursue the corporation’s general and specific public benefit. This lim-
itation on liability, which is significantly different from that imposed on direc-
tors and officers of a traditional for-profit corporation,243 protects directors and 
officers of benefit corporations from fiduciary liability even when they act 
with an avowed purpose that would require the sacrificing of the financial in-
terests of shareholders. Social purpose corporations adopt similar limitations 
on the liability of directors.244 
c. Enforcement and Remedies 
Shareholders of benefit corporations retain the same rights they would 
have in traditional corporate models.245 They have the right to elect directors 
and to vote on important corporate decisions such as amendments to the char-
ter or mergers or acquisitions. They have the same rights to bring derivative 
suits for a director’s breach of fiduciary duty and suits to compel review of the 
company’s books and records. But, in addition to these standard corporate 
rights, benefit corporation shareholders and stakeholders can also have a pri-
vate right of action to enforce the public benefit mission of a benefit corpora-
tion. 
More specifically, in several states the benefit corporation itself, its share-
holders, directors, any individuals named in the articles of incorporation,246 
and, in the case of a benefit corporation that is a subsidiary, any owner of five 
percent or more of the stock of the parent company, may avail themselves of a 
special type of derivative proceeding.247 This proceeding allows qualifying 
plaintiffs to bring a “benefit enforcement proceeding” for the corporation’s 
alleged failure to pursue a general or specific public benefit and the violation 
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of any special duty or standard of conduct imposed by statute or the corpora-
tion’s articles.248 The ability of non-shareholder stakeholders named in a bene-
fit corporation’s articles to pursue a benefit enforcement proceeding is unprec-
edented and completely foreign to traditional for-profit corporation statutes. 
This right of standing, when granted to non-shareholder stakeholders in a ben-
efit corporation’s articles, serves as a powerful deterrent against a corporation 
favoring profits over a general public benefit. 
Benefit corporations are such a new phenomenon that there are no decid-
ed cases or other guidance regarding the remedies available pursuant to a bene-
fit enforcement proceeding. Presumably, because monetary damages are ordi-
narily not allowed, remedies will involve some form of injunctive relief or 
specific performance.249 A court might require the directors of a benefit corpo-
ration to comply with the terms of the statute or the corporation’s governing 
documents (e.g., failure to issue an annual report). Alternatively, after directors 
cause the corporation to take an action to which the shareholders object (e.g., 
raising prices, declining to utilize solar energy, etc.), a court might require the 
directors to reconsider their decision before allowing the corporation to pro-
ceed with the implementation of such a decision. Even though this private right 
of action is available only to directors and shareholders in the absence of a des-
ignation in the benefit corporation’s articles, the presence of a broader range of 
stakeholders leaves open interesting questions about the ability of a benefit 
corporation to grant the right to bring such actions to third-party beneficiaries, 
such as patients and patient groups.250 
For social purpose corporations, the available remedy is less clear. Cali-
fornia, for instance, allows traditional shareholder derivative actions in the 
name of the social purpose corporation against a director or directors, but be-
cause monetary damages are not available (except for bad faith, intentional 
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misconduct, or conflicting interest transactions), presumably only injunctive 
relief is available. Such injunctive relief is likely to be similar to that allowed 
in benefit enforcement proceedings in the benefit corporation context. 
d. Annual Reports 
Most relevant state statutes require benefit corporations to produce annual 
written reports concerning their performance, which may or may not be public, 
depending upon the state.251 Such annual reports are meant to provide a mech-
anism for analyzing a benefit corporation’s progress in achieving its public 
benefit(s). In some states, the reports must assess the corporation’s perfor-
mance against independent, third-party standards designed to measure “general 
public benefit,” while in other states, reports must assess a corporation’s per-
formance against standards adopted by its board of directors.252 Where the re-
ports must be based upon independent, third-party standards, B Lab is the lead-
ing publisher of such standards. The B Lab standards require reporting on five 
broad categories: environment, workers, community, customers, and govern-
ance.253 Similarly, while social purpose corporations are also typically required 
to report on their progress towards achieving their specific social purpose, the 
reporting requirements are generally less comprehensive than those for benefit 
corporations.254 For a healthcare benefit corporation, the reporting requirement 
could extend to include health-specific reporting requirements, analogous to 
the 501(r) requirements for tax exempt hospitals to conduct and post their 
community health assessments. These healthcare reporting requirements could 
also be used for comparative performance analysis of healthcare companies. 
e. Further Limitations on Ability to Deviate from Benefit Form or Purpose 
Benefit corporations provide directors with the ability to take into account 
factors other than price even when deciding whether and to whom to sell the 
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company.255 Moreover, relinquishing benefit corporation status prior to or in 
connection with a sale or other major transaction usually requires a higher than 
normal shareholder vote, as do material changes to the corporation’s charter, 
including changes to its purpose and form.256 
B. An Argument for Mandating Hybrid Business Forms  
in Healthcare Markets 
Incorporating general and specific benefits into corporate decision-
making offers a promising way of reconciling conflicts between private profit 
driven interests and public need. As discussed in Part II, healthcare markets 
have special features that result in a divergence of private incentives from pub-
lic health value. Yet, the same special features that make healthcare markets 
unique (and uniquely troubled), also make them an ideal site for hybrid entities 
such as benefit corporations and special purpose corporations. As discussed 
above, benefit corporations have special governance features that allow for a 
balanced consideration of shareholder value and the healthcare benefit corpo-
ration’s stated public objectives. These governance features include: (1) annual 
reporting and assessment against objective standards of progress toward 
achieving the benefit corporation’s non-pecuniary purpose; (2) the ability of 
directors and shareholders to sue the corporation for failure to pursue its non-
pecuniary purpose; and (3) higher shareholder voting thresholds for altering 
the non-pecuniary purpose or converting the corporation (via reincorporation, 
merger, sale of assets, etc.) from benefit status to a regular corporation. Most 
importantly, adopting a hybrid form involves, or at least should involve, ex-
plicitly recognizing that the identified social mission is a part of the corporate 
mission and therefore, informs all decisions. This can be distinguished from 
most forms of corporate social responsibility, which are essentially tangential 
to corporate decisions.257 These beneficial features would allow for a positive 
change in corporate decision-making by changing incentives to address public 
                                                                                                                           
 255 See Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Di-
chotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (May 13, 2012), https://corp
gov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/ 
[https://perma.cc/X6NL-3HCK] (recommending that state benefit corporation statutes allow directors 
to consider factors other than price when analyzing takeover offers). 
 256 See, e.g., MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION, supra note 231, § 105(b) (stating that 
any sale shall not be effective unless the transaction is approved by two-thirds vote, and further stating 
that an amendment to remove the status of the corporation must be approved by two-thirds vote). 
Shareholders who dissent from major changes in the benefit corporation’s purpose can bring appraisal 
rights claims. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 14603(a) (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 5 
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN § 33-38-600 (West 2012). 
 257 See BAKAN, supra note 19, at 34–35, 37 (detailing how the corporate model dissuades direc-
tors from being socially responsible). 
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needs from the inside. We therefore argue that healthcare companies should be 
required or, at the very least, strongly incentivized to incorporate or re-
incorporate as benefit corporations and social purpose corporations (for sim-
plicity, benefit corporations). 
This approach has many potential advantages. The main advantage of re-
quiring, or incentivizing, healthcare companies to incorporate as benefit corpo-
rations is in giving them the ability, and the mandate, to internalize public 
health concerns and incorporate such concerns into the company’s decision-
making. As explained earlier, for a benefit corporation, shareholder value need  
not be the ultimate test of success. Replacing traditional corporations with 
benefit corporations would modify the metrics on which corporate decisions 
are based to include broader public health measures. Although profitability 
(and therefore, financial sustainability) would still be a concern, the addition of 
other required considerations would cause companies to consider a broader 
range of choices and weigh a broader range of consequences. Concern about 
stock price would be tempered with concerns about meeting the social objec-
tives of the corporation. Similarly, manager performance—and hence compen-
sation—could be measured by accomplishment of a social mission as well as 
profitability. Directors and managers would fulfill their fiduciary duties guided 
by both mission and profitability rather than profitability alone, while being 
sheltered from the threat of personal liability for doing so. 
To see how this ability, and mandate, might have a positive public health 
impact, suppose, for example, that a company that produces a drug used to 
mitigate the symptoms that certain patients with Alzheimer’s disease experi-
ence is facing two kinds of decisions—one about whether to increase the price 
of its existing drug in light of limited competition, and a second decision about 
whether to invest in a low risk improvement of this drug rather than to make a 
bigger investment in a much riskier new drug candidate that has the potential 
to cure the disease. A for-profit corporation will likely increase the price to 
maximize profits, taking into account only the likely impact on demand and 
constraints on price imposed by payors, if any. This same company will con-
sider the expected risk-adjusted profits from investing in each drug project 
and, given the high risk, will likely choose the safer project. A benefit corpora-
tion that has included the pursuit of public health as one of its objectives, 
alongside profit, will pay attention to the negative health impact of a price in-
crease and be less likely to raise prices. This same benefit corporation will in-
clude the significant public health benefit of the second project and the nomi-
nal public health benefit of the first project in its cost-benefit calculations and 
will be more likely to select the second project. 
Second, as benefit corporations, healthcare companies would be required 
to report on their decisions—in many cases publicly—thus making such deci-
sions available for scrutiny by patient advocacy groups, other healthcare stake-
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holders, and shareholders alike. This reporting requirement would increase 
transparency on important corporate decisions such as what R&D projects to 
pursue, what prices to charge for products and services, what research data to 
make publicly available, and what approach to take in the face of competition. 
Much of the policy discussion over drug pricing has focused on price transpar-
ency, and this reporting requirement will facilitate the desired increase in 
transparency and thus allow for easier monitoring of corporate decisions. 
Third, like traditional corporations, shareholders of a healthcare benefit 
corporation would remain the primary watchdogs of corporate behavior. Yet, as 
benefit corporations, healthcare companies are likely to attract at least some 
investors interested in social impact. Hence, unlike in traditional corporations, 
corporate watchdogs would now likely include shareholders who seek social 
objectives alongside private wealth creation. The effectiveness of this approach 
will depend on the nature and strength of the mechanisms that shareholders 
have available for measuring social impact and enforcing the public interest. 
Current mechanisms are likely too weak to overcome the natural tendency to-
wards profit maximization, but future mechanisms—instituted alongside cor-
porate governance reforms such as the one proposed in this Article—could 
allow for a more active stakeholder role in policing the public interest. 
Fourth, changing the corporate form of healthcare companies to benefit 
corporations would introduce new and potentially more effective ways of regu-
lating firm behavior. Current benefit corporations statutes mandate a variety of 
means of checking firm behavior, including the requirement to appoint benefit 
directors to the board and the institution of mechanisms for allowing share-
holders to address corporate deviations from stated public benefits.258 Even 
though experience with such enforcement mechanisms is limited due to the 
newness of hybrid corporate forms, they would provide potentially effective 
tools to check corporate behavior “from the inside.” Addressing problems from 
the inside could also reduce the problem of regulatory capture that pervades 
many aspects of the healthcare industry. 
The resulting aggregate effect of the potential advantages described above 
is likely to be a narrowing of the gap between private incentives of healthcare 
corporations and public health need. Finally, to ensure that the changes are en-
during, healthcare companies that are benefit corporations will have the ability 
to include restrictions on amending corporate purpose, on unilaterally convert-
ing to traditional corporate form, and on acquisition of hybrid corporations by 
traditional corporations. 
There are strong reasons for targeting the corporate form as a means of af-
fecting change in healthcare. Primary among them is the ability to harness the 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See supra notes 236–256 and accompanying text. 
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private information and private decision making of companies to achieve pub-
lic goals. Companies are both the best source of and in the best position to 
evaluate information about their cost structures, assets, and opportunities, and 
the trade-offs involved in alternative decisions. Further, even under the strictest 
public reporting requirements, companies still make many decisions that are 
not visible to the market and would be difficult or impossible to regulate exter-
nally (e.g., whether to terminate an R&D program for a promising drug with 
low market value or how to price their products and services). 
We also suggest that at least in some cases, benefit corporations offer ad-
vantages over non-profit corporations. Despite stated good intentions, nonprof-
it corporations often suffer from a lack of market discipline—an undeniably 
strong driver for innovation and economic efficiencies—and effective monitor-
ing of their performance.259 In addition, non-profit organizations are not im-
mune to the role of profit, although it is not considered profit. They care about 
the magnitude of their revenues and their ability to increase spending, they 
have flexibility in determining whether their actions are in furtherance of their 
mission, and their executives are compensated in ways that are increasingly 
similar to the compensation of for-profit executives.260 Benefit corporations, on 
the other hand, lack neither market discipline nor monitoring of performance. 
Equity (via shares) creates accountability to shareholders, and if accomplish-
ment of a social mission was to become an integral part of healthcare corpora-
tions, accountability for pursuing such missions would follow. In addition, the 
availability of financing and risk capital may well be the same as with tradi-
                                                                                                                           
 259 Although regulated by the IRS and state AGs, nonprofit corporations often lack direct and 
effective oversight. See Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure and the ACA: A Need for 
Mission Primacy Through a New Organizational Paradigm?, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 103, 126–30 
(2015) (summarizing studies of the performance of non-profit hospitals and finding mixed results, 
including findings that suggest little difference between for-profits and non-profits in their concern for 
public benefit and expressing various concerns about the performance of non-profit hospitals). 
 260 See, e.g., Karen E. Joynt et al., Compensation of Chief Executive Officers at Non-Profit Hospi-
tals, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 61, 61 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24126743 
[https://perma.cc/5C3L-MPFY] (analyzing hospital CEOs’ compensation models and whether they 
are tied to quality healthcare outcomes); Elizabeth K. Keating & Peter Frumkin, What Drives Non-
profit Executive Compensation?, NONPROFIT Q. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/
10/06/what-drives-nonprofit-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/GT3G-LKTR] (showing 
some similarities in factors that influence executive compensation); see also Salvador Curiel, Are For-
Profit Salaries Higher than Nonprofit Salaries?, CTR FOR NON-PROFIT MGMT. NEWSLETTER, https://
cnmsocal.org/featured/are-for-profit-salaries-always-higher-than-nonprofit-salaries/ [https://perma.cc/
M3P4-MDWE] (reporting some non-profit hospital salaries to be higher than for-profit); Andrea 
Fuller, Charity Officials Are Increasingly Receiving Million-Dollar Paydays, WALL ST J., (Mar. 6, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/charity-officials-are-increasingly-receiving-million-dollar-pay
days-1488754532 [http://perma.cc/W2R7-DDBX] (documenting the rise in number of people receiv-
ing seven-figure compensation packages at the non-profit level). 
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tional for-profit corporations—not limited to debt-financing as in the nonprofit 
sector. 
There are, of course, some significant risks and limitations with our pro-
posed approach, but we believe these can be surmounted or at least managed 
with appropriate regulatory support. The main concerns with relying on benefit 
corporations (in their current statutory forms) as a mechanism for improving 
healthcare outcomes include: (1) adequate enforcement of the duty of the bene-
fit corporation to pursue and protect non-shareholder interests; (2) measuring 
and balancing non-shareholder interests against shareholder interests in max-
imizing company value; and (3) concerns about the ability of benefit corpora-
tions to attract the investment needed to pursue ambitious healthcare projects. 
Starting with the question of enforcement: having a duty to pursue non-
shareholder interests will result in change in healthcare outcomes only if, and 
to the extent that, company decision-makers are (1) motivated to pursue such 
interests and (2) face negative consequences when failing to do so. A mecha-
nism for addressing this challenge is the “benefit enforcement proceeding” 
instituted under many state statutes, which gives shareholders and dissenting 
directors the ability to seek remedies for breaches of the benefit corporation’s 
public benefit duties.261 
The challenge of finding good measures of public benefit is especially 
pertinent in the context of healthcare. Indeed, measuring the value of 
healthcare has plagued many types of healthcare reforms, including more re-
cent efforts to shift to value-based models of healthcare provision.262 Such ef-
forts have nonetheless led to improved methods of quantifying healthcare val-
ue that can also be deployed for measuring the performance of healthcare ben-
efit corporations. Even where measures of value are most challenging, there 
remain clear decisions that have no positive effect on the public interest, such 
as gratuitous price increases or decisions to hide information about adverse 
effects of a healthcare product, that can be addressed. 
The remaining challenge of attracting adequate investment to pursue 
healthcare innovation and finance healthcare production may be the most con-
cerning. One of the weaknesses of the non-profit model is the inability to har-
ness private sector investment, and although in theory benefit corporations do 
                                                                                                                           
 261 Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the 
Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 871–
72 (2012). 
 262 See, e.g., Six Serious Problems with “Value-Based” Purchasing and How to Solve Them, 
MICH. HEALTH POLICY F., http://michiganhpf.msu.edu/index.php/2-uncategorised/28-six-serious-
problems-with-value-based-purchasing [https://perma.cc/RW45-ZE2V] (discussing the difficulty 
Medicare faces in assigning retrospective accountability to medical providers using value-based pur-
chasing decisions). 
138 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:73 
not suffer from this limitation since they are free to raise funds by selling equi-
ty, they might in practice be less attractive for private investors than traditional 
for-profit corporations. There are reasons to believe that this challenge can be 
overcome, however. First, the healthcare sector offers many opportunities for 
profit, and if most or all of healthcare companies were required or sufficiently 
incentivized to be (or become) benefit corporations, investors who wanted to 
access the profits in this sector would have no choice but to invest in benefit 
corporations. Second, there has been a rise in socially conscious investing, 
with a particular focus on health. And third, benefit corporations might offer 
useful vehicles for the pooling of public and private funds, with public funding 
justified on the grounds of supporting public goods and addressing externali-
ties. With the expectation of favorable treatment by the public, and possibly 
also philanthropic funders, private investors may well be willing to invest de-
spite the additional restrictions imposed on benefit corporations. 
C. Proposed Approach: Making HealthCare Companies  
(Re)Incorporate as Benefit Corporations 
The change in the business form of healthcare corporations that we pro-
pose is, admittedly, not easy to accomplish. Yet, for the reasons discussed in 
this Article, we believe this change is not only warranted but necessary to ad-
dress the disconnect between corporate decision making and public health 
needs. Determining how to begin such a shift in approach in healthcare mar-
kets is challenging. Since the first benefit corporations law was passed in Mar-
yland in 2010, a number of businesses have become benefit corporations.263 
Although relatively few are in the healthcare market, early examples are prom-
ising.264 In order to reap the benefits of the proposed approach for healthcare 
markets, however, healthcare companies must either be required or strongly 
incentivized to adopt a hybrid form. Anything short of a comprehensive shift in 
healthcare corporate form is likely to place healthcare benefit corporations at a 
significant competitive disadvantage in relation to the profit-driven corpora-
tions that currently occupy healthcare markets. 
                                                                                                                           
 263 Well-known examples of benefit corporations include Kickstarter, Patagonia, and Laureate 
Education. General Questions, supra note 245. 
 264 One such notable example is HomeCare Associates (“HCA”) of Philadelphia, which demon-
strates how the approach proposed here might work to improve performance in the healthcare industry 
without direct government intervention. HCA has focused on tackling the competing objectives of 
quality homecare at low costs while also improving training and providing higher compensation for 
homecare workers. Why Home Care Workers Struggle with Low Wages, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 16, 
2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/home-health-care-workers-struggle-low-wages/ [https://
perma.cc/55BA-4RV4]. 
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One possible course of action would be for states to require companies 
operating in certain sectors pertaining to healthcare to incorporate or restruc-
ture themselves as hybrid organizations. We suggest that this requirement 
should apply broadly to all providers of healthcare products and services, in-
cluding not just pharmaceutical and medical device companies but also 
healthcare maintenance organizations, pharmacy benefit management compa-
nies, healthcare services such as nursing homes, home health, and health staff-
ing companies. This approach, while having the potential to be effective, how-
ever, is bound to raise numerous legal and practical challenges, most notably 
the need for a critical mass of states to act in unison to avoid forum shopping 
by healthcare corporations. 
Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, states and the federal government 
could provide incentives for certain critical sectors of healthcare businesses to 
incorporate or restructure themselves as hybrid entities. First, property and 
other taxes, licensing requirements, and regulatory provisions normally im-
posed upon healthcare corporations could be decreased or eliminated for hy-
brid organizations. Second, federal and state laws could be used to provide 
legal, regulatory, tax, and other incentives for the incorporation of certain 
healthcare businesses as benefit corporations. FDA laws could, for example, 
grant “fast-track” approval or even additional exclusivity periods for biomedi-
cal products developed by benefit corporations; tax laws could impose lower 
tax rates on them; federal and state laws could provide preferential treatment in 
dealing with benefit corporations under state Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams, and so forth.265 
Perhaps the most important condition for success of this proposal will be 
the ability to hold healthcare benefit corporations accountable for acting in ways 
consistent with their public purpose. We believe that this will require stronger 
oversight mechanisms than those existing under current state laws. If the direc-
tors and shareholders are disingenuous about advancing the non-pecuniary pur-
pose of the healthcare benefit corporation, for example, there is very little or no 
recourse at all available to the public or consumers.266 To address this concern, 
we propose that the Federal Trade Commission, with its roots in the protection of 
the consumer and the public, or some other similar government or state agency, 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See Eiser & Field, supra note 23, at 651–52 (proposing that Congress should give benefit 
corporations preferred treatment when seeking partners for NIH Cooperative Research and Develop-
ment Agreements). 
 266 Third parties have no right of action against a corporation, benefit or not. See Haig Panossian, 
Workers vs. Shareholders Under United States Corporate Law: Reforming Corporate Fiduciary Law 
to Protect Worker Interests, 10 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 106 (2007) (stating that even when 
state statutes allow corporations to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, the stat-
utes “do not give the non-shareholder constituencies a private right of action with which to seek re-
course when their interests are not considered”). 
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be granted the right to sue benefit corporations for failure to pursue their non-
pecuniary purpose. This right may be mandated by law or explicitly included in 
healthcare benefit corporations’ articles of incorporation. In case of the latter, 
healthcare benefit corporations could be incentivized to include such voluntary 
submission to regulation by making it a pre-requisite for entitlement to one or 
more governmental benefits such as those enumerated above. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article we have argued that the disconnect between healthcare mar-
ket outcomes and public health needs can be traced to a divergence between the 
private incentives that for-profit healthcare companies face in healthcare markets 
and the public health benefit of their actions. Our proposal is to change these 
incentives “from the inside” by making healthcare companies (re)incorporate in 
hybrid corporate forms. We suggest that given the current state of the law, bene-
fit corporations offer an attractive form for healthcare corporations since they 
require the pursuit of both profit and non-pecuniary objectives. If a healthcare 
company incorporates (or reincorporates) as a benefit corporation with advanc-
ing public health as the non-pecuniary purpose, its directors would be required to 
cause the corporation to advance public health, even at the expense of some de-
cline in revenue for the corporation. This is not to say that profits will no longer 
inform healthcare (benefit) corporations’ decisions, but rather that profit consid-
erations will represent part of a balance of interests among shareholder and non-
shareholder stakeholders in corporate decision-making. In short: profitability 
will no longer be the sole measure of a healthcare corporation’s success, opening 
up opportunities for incorporating public health directly into corporate decision 
making. Although hybrids are still a relatively new phenomenon in corporate 
law, we conclude that they have the potential to mitigate at least some of the 
problems with the current incentive structure faced by healthcare corporations, 
and thus to improve the ability of our healthcare system to meet public health 
needs.  
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